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I. Introduction
Numerous academic studies have investigated relationships between
health insurance status and a wide variety of outcomes such as healthcare utilization,
health status, labor supply, and participation in public assistance programs. In more
than 70 articles surveyed by Gruber and Madrian (2004), Levy and Meltzer (2004),
and Buchmueller et al. (2005), nearly all parameters of interest are identified using
parametric approaches.1
We develop the first nonparametric framework for studying the potential impact of
universal health insurance on the nation’s use of medical services. Within this frame-
work, we study relationships between insurance status and use of services (expendi-
tures and number of provider visits) in an environment of uncertainty about both
counterfactual utilization outcomes and status quo insurance status. Uncertainty
about counterfactuals arises because insurance status is not randomly assigned.
For example, families that expect to use more health services have more incentive
to acquire health insurance. More generally, insurance status depends on individual
and family characteristics that may also influence healthcare use. Utilization patterns
among households who become insured though expanded programs would not nec-
essarily resemble observed utilization patterns among households that had already
self-selected into insured status on their own.
Beyond the uncertainty created by unknown counterfactuals, validation studies
have recently called into question the reliability of households’ responses to ques-
tions about their current insurance status. Significant misreporting has been docu-
mented in several popular surveys including the Current Population Survey (CPS),
the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP), the Behavioral Risk Factor
Surveillance System (BRFSS) survey, the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey
(MEPS), and others (Davern et al. 2007; Card, Hildreth, and Shore-Sheppard
2004; Hill 2007/2008; Nelson et al. 2000). Estimated error rates, which vary across
surveys, have been linked in part to difficulties in recalling past coverage and diffi-
culties reporting the status of other family members (Nelson et al. 2000; Pascale
2007). The Census Bureau now issues caveats about the accuracy of insurance esti-
mates from the CPS (DeNaves-Walt, Proctor, and Hill Lee 2005).
Using matched surveys of employers and their employees, Berger, Black, and
Scott (1998) find that 21 percent of the workers and their employers disagree about
whether the worker was eligible for insurance. Their study appears to represent the
only prior analysis of potentially mismeasured insurance status in an econometric
framework. Assuming exogenous measurement error in a classical errors-in-variables
setting (after accounting for the binary nature of the mismeasured variable), they find
that even nonsystematic reporting error seriously biases their estimated effect of
insurance eligibility on wage growth.
The presence of reporting errors compromises a researcher’s ability to make reli-
able inferences about the status quo, and it further confounds identification of
1. As an exception, Olson (1998) uses semiparametric techniques to estimate the relationship between
women’s labor hours and the availability of health insurance through a spouse. More recently, Gerfin
and Schellhorn (2006) use nonparametric techniques and Swiss data to bound the effects of deductibles
on the probability of visiting a physician.
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counterfactual outcomes associated with policies that would alter the distribution of
insurance coverage within the population, such as national health insurance.2 Consis-
tent with such concerns, some advocates have argued that uncertainty about the num-
bers and characteristics of the uninsured constitutes an important barrier to
identifying optimal policy solutions (for example, Hunter 2004; Woolhandler and
Himmelstein 2007). Highlighting surprising degrees of insurance classification error
in many popular national surveys, along with dramatic inconsistencies in responses
when experimental followup insurance questions have been posed, Czajka and Lewis
(1999) write: ‘‘Until we can make progress in separating the measurement error from
the reality of uninsurance, our policy solutions will continue to be inefficient, and our
ability to measure our successes will continue to be limited.’’
Our analysis extends the nonparametric literature on partially identified probabil-
ity distributions in several dimensions. First, we provide sharp bounds on the condi-
tional mean of a random variable (in our case healthcare visits or expenditures) for
the case that a binary conditioning variable (insurance status) is subject to arbitrary
endogenous classification error. In this environment, insurance reporting errors are
allowed to be arbitrarily related to true insurance status and healthcare use. These
results extend parts of the analyses of Horowitz and Manski (1998) and Kreider
and Pepper (2007). Second, we formally assess how statistical identification of a
treatment effect decays with the degree of uncertainty about the status quo. Our ap-
proach extends the nonparametric treatment effect literature for the case that some
treatments are unobserved (especially Molinari, Forthcoming).3 Third, we relax the
nondifferential errors independence assumption evaluated, for example, by Bollinger
(1996) and Bound, Brown, and Mathiowetz (2001) embedded in the classical errors-
in-variables model. As an alternative, we evaluate the identifying power of a weaker
‘‘nonincreasing errors’’ monotonicity assumption that presumes that misreporting of
insurance status does not rise with the level of utilization. This assumption allows for
the possibility, for example, that using health services informs a patient of her true
insurance status.4
We exploit detailed data in the 1996 MEPS to construct health insurance valida-
tion data for a nonrandom portion of the sample based on insurance cards, policy
booklets, and followback interviews with employers and insurance companies. The
next section describes these data and our health insurance verification strategy. Sec-
tion III formalizes the identification problem associated with estimating a particular
descriptive statistic, the gap in health service use between the status quo insured and
uninsured under existing policies, when insurance status is subject to arbitrary
2. The extent to which universal coverage would increase use of services and expenditures has been esti-
mated in a variety of parametric studies (Institute of Medicine 2003; Blumberg et al. 2006). Estimates of
incremental spending range from $34 to $69 billion per year depending on the statistical assumptions and
choice of comparison groups.
3. To isolate identification problems associated with partially unobserved insurance status as a conditioning
variable or treatment, we assume that other variables in the analysis are measured without error.
4. Using methods in Lewbel (2007), the treatment effects could be point-identified in certain cases if we
had instruments that affect insurance status but not classification error or the average treatment effect. For
related work on potentially endogenous classification errors in a linear regression framework, see Frazis and
Loewenstein (2003). Given the difficulty in identifying plausible instruments in our application, we con-
sider what can be identified in the absence of instruments.
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patterns of classification error. We derive bounds on the unknown utilization gap un-
der alternative assumptions about the nature and degree of reporting errors. Extend-
ing these results, Section IV investigates what can be learned about the impact of
national health insurance on the use of health services. Combining our ‘‘nonincreas-
ing errors’’ assumption with common monotonicity assumptions in the treatment
effects literature, such as monotone treatment response (related to moral hazard)
and monotone treatment selection (related to adverse selection), we can provide rea-
sonably tight bounds on the impact of universal coverage without relying on some of
the more controversial assumptions involving functional forms and independence.
Our primary set of estimates focuses on policies that would extend coverage to the
uninsured using the same mixture of private and public insurance that exists under
the status quo. Another set of estimates focuses on policies that would extend exist-
ing public programs to cover the uninsured. Both types of expansions have been
implemented by states. Hawaii, Illinois, Pennsylvania, and Washington created pub-
lic programs open to all uninsured children but with premiums for higher income
families (Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured 2007). Maine, Massa-
chusetts, and Vermont expanded public programs and developed new programs with
subsidized premiums and other features (Kaye and Snyder 2007). Massachusetts also
mandates that individuals purchase insurance, facilitated with subsidies for low-
income adults and fees for employers that do not provide coverage (Holahan and
Blumberg 2006). California and other states are considering proposals with features
similar to those of Massachusetts, and prominent presidential candidates also advo-
cate covering the uninsured with a mixture of private and public insurance. Section V
compares our nonparametric estimates with those from parametric studies, and Sec-
tion VI concludes.
II. The Medical Expenditure Panel Survey
The data come from the 1996 Medical Expenditure Panel Survey
(MEPS), a nationally representative household survey conducted by the U.S. Agency
for Health care Research and Quality. In the MEPS Household Component (MEPS
HC), each family (reporting unit) was interviewed five times over two and a half
years to obtain annual data reflecting a two-year reference period (Cohen 1997). This
paper focuses on the nonelderly population because almost all adults become eligible
for Medicare at age 65. The sample contains 18,851 individuals.
We study insurance and service use in July 1996. We focus on July because the
1996 MEPS has a followback survey of employers, unions, and insurance companies
which reported insurance information as of July 1, 1996. We use 1996 data because
that is the only year for which respondents to the followback survey reported on the
employees’ and policyholders’ insurance status rather than whether the establish-
ment offered insurance.5 Studying insurance and service use in one month also
reduces the likelihood of confounding the dynamics of insurance status with
5. These data are available at the AHRQ Data Center.
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misreported insurance status because employment-related insurance typically covers
an entire month.
A. Insurance Status Reported in the Household Component
The MEPS HC asks about insurance from a comprehensive list of all possible sour-
ces of insurance. In the first interview, conducted between March and August 1996,
MEPS HC asked the family respondent about insurance held at any time since Jan-
uary 1st. Because employment-related insurance is the most prevalent source of in-
surance, the family respondent was asked about all jobs held by coresiding family
members since January 1st, jobs family members had retired from, and the last
job held. The family respondent was asked whether the employee had insurance from
each job. Then the family respondent was asked whether anyone had:
• Medicare
• Medicaid
• Champus/Champva
• For those who did not report Medicaid, any other type of health insurance
through any state or local government agency which provided hospital and phy-
sician benefits
• Health benefits from other state programs or other public programs providing
coverage for healthcare services6
• Other sources of private insurance, such as from a group or association, insur-
ance company, previous employer, or union.
For each source of insurance, MEPS HC asked which family members were covered
and when.7
In the second interview, conducted between August and December 1996, MEPS
HC asked questions based on jobs and insurance reported to be held at the time of
the first interview to determine whether previously reported insurance was still held
or when it ended. MEPS also asked about new jobs and insurance from those jobs,
public insurance acquired since the first interview, and insurance acquired from other
sources since the first interview. The recall period is not especially long, typically
four to seven months. Responses to the questions from the first and second interview
were used to construct indicators of insurance coverage at any time during July 1996
and uninsurance, the residual category. Family respondents reported 80.7 percent of
the nonelderly population was insured in July 1996 and 19.3 percent were uninsured
(Table 1).
6. A very small number of individuals are reportedly covered through Aid to Families with Dependent
Children (AFDC) or Supplemental Security Income (SSI), and these are counted as Medicaid. Other sour-
ces, such as the Veterans Administration and the Indian Health Services, are not included in measures of
hospital/physician insurance.
7. State-specific program names are used in the questions. Insurance status is not imputed to families with
missing data, which are rare.
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B. Service Use and Expenditures
In each interview, the MEPS asks about healthcare services used by all coresiding
family members since the last interview. The MEPS also obtains permission to inter-
view a sample of the medical providers identified in the Household Component sur-
veys to supplement household-reported healthcare expenditure and source of
payment information. We create measures of service use and expenditures in July
1996: number of provider visits for ambulatory medical care (a medical provider
visit, hospital outpatient visit, or emergency room visit), an indicator for whether
the sample person had a hospital stay or ambulatory services, and expenditures for
hospital stays and ambulatory services. Twenty-one percent of the (weighted) sample
used medical care in that month.8 Persons who the family respondent said were in-
sured in July were nearly 80 percent more likely to have used medical care (22.5 per-
cent of the insured versus 12.7 percent of the uninsured, Table 1). The mean number
of provider visits is also much greater for the reportedly insured, as are mean expen-
ditures.
C. Verification Data
We use detailed data to identify sample members for whom there is evidence cor-
roborating their insurance status. The 1996 MEPS includes three sources that can be
used to confirm health insurance reported by families: (1) the HC interviewers ask
respondents to show insurance cards, (2) the HC interviewers ask respondents to pro-
vide policy booklets, and (3) separate interviews were conducted with family mem-
bers’ employers and insurance companies. Respondents for the family, employers, or
insurance companies could err in reporting a person’s insurance status; none provides
a gold standard of information. Nonetheless, we use confirmations of insurance status
to formally verify the insurance status of some sample members. This approach rep-
resents a compromise between taking reported insurance status at face value for all
sample members and discarding valuable family respondents’ reports about insur-
ance status.
We label sample members as verified insured if an insurance card was shown at the
time of the interview, a policy booklet was given to the interviewer, or if an employer
or insurance company confirmed that the person was covered by insurance. We as-
sume that a report that a sample member is uninsured is accurate as long as there
is no contradictory information from any family member’s employers and all
employers provided data. The person’s insurance status was not verified (but not as-
sumed to be incorrect) if there were insufficient verification data or if employers or
insurance companies contradicted the family respondent. See Hill (2007/2008) for
details.
As shown in Table 1, we find that 80.2 percent of the reportedly insured were con-
firmed as insured by a card, policy booklet, or an establishment. For the few cases in
which a respondent produced an insurance card but the establishment reported that
the person was uninsured, we treat these cases as verified insured based on the phys-
ical evidence of insurance. Among the reportedly uninsured, 11.7 percent are verified
8. In the MEPS, outpatient prescription medications, medical supplies, and durable medical equipment are
not linked to specific months; these expenditures are excluded.
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(Table 1). This relatively low number reflects the lack of an employed family mem-
ber in some uninsured families and the lack of response by some employers. Recall
that uninsurance is verified under this strategy only if all of the family’s employers
responded and confirmed that they did not provide insurance to the sample member.
Overall, 67 percent of the sample was verified.
III. Identifying Utilization Differences Between the
Insured and Uninsured
We now study what can be learned about differences in healthcare
utilization between the insured and uninsured when we cannot perfectly distinguish
between the truly insured and uninsured. In Section IV, we extend the analysis be-
yond descriptive statistics to assess what can be learned about the potential impacts
of universal coverage. We ignore heterogeneity of insurance plans and treat coverage
as a binary event. Let I* ¼ 1 indicate that a person is truly insured, with I* ¼ 0 other-
wise. Instead of observing I*, we observe the self-reported counterpart I. A latent var-
iable Z* indicates whether a report is accurate. If I and I* coincide, then Z* ¼ 1;
otherwise, Z* ¼ 0. Let Y ¼ 1 indicate that I is verified to be accurate (that is, Z*
is known to equal 1). If Y ¼ 0, then Z* may be either 1 or 0.9 In no case is the value
of Z* assumed to be 0.10
Let U denote the amount of healthcare services consumed during the reference pe-
riod. Typically, the amount of care is measured as health expenditures or number of
provider visits. Policymakers are also interested in the proportion of the population
that uses any medical care, in which case U can be treated as a binary variable. In this
section, we investigate what can be learned about the status quo utilization gap be-
tween the insured and uninsured,
D ¼ EðUjI ¼ 1Þ2EðUjI ¼ 0Þ;ð1Þ
when true insurance status, I*, is unobserved for part of the sample.11
The utilization gap D is not identified since we observe EðUjIÞ but not EðUjIÞ.
Our objective is to provide worst-case bounds on D. To partially identify EðUjIÞ,
we will first derive bounds on the fraction of the population that consumes no more
than a particular amount of care t conditional on unobserved insurance status,
PðU# tjIÞ. We can then provide bounds on EðUjIÞ by integrating over these
worst-case probabilities.
We begin by writing
9. In their analysis of testing for environmental pollutants, Dominitz and Sherman (2004) were the first to
formalize the idea of distinguishing between ‘‘verified’’ and ‘‘unverified’’ observations in the data.
10. That is, we conservatively allow for the possibility that the MEPS insurance classification is accurate
even if the classification is not formally verified.
11. Our notation leaves implicit any other covariates of interest. We focus on bounding the utilization gap
for the nonelderly population as a whole, but it is straightforward to condition on subpopulations of interest.
Note that we are not estimating a regression, and there are no regression orthogonality conditions to be sat-
isfied.
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PðU # tjI ¼ 1Þ ¼ PðU # t; I
 ¼ 1Þ
PðI ¼ 1Þ :ð2Þ
Neither the numerator nor the denominator is identified, but assumptions on the pat-
tern of classification errors can place restrictions on relationships between the unob-
served quantities. Let u+t [PðU# t; I ¼ 1; Z ¼ 0Þ and u2t [PðU# t; I ¼ 0; Z ¼ 0Þ
denote the fraction of false positive and false negative insurance classifications,
respectively, for those whose medical consumption did not exceed t. Let
u#+t [PðU. t; I ¼ 1; Z ¼ 0Þ and u#2t [PðU. t; I ¼ 0; Z ¼ 0Þ denote the analogous
fractions for those whose use of care exceeded t. We can then decompose the numer-
ator and denominator in Equation 2 into identified and unidentified quantities:
PðU # tjI ¼ 1Þ ¼ PðU # t; I ¼ 1Þ + u
2
t 2u
+
t
PðI ¼ 1Þ + ðu2t + u#2t Þ2ðu +t + u# +t Þ
ð3Þ
where PðU# t; I ¼ 1Þ and PðI ¼ 1Þ are identified by the data. In the numerator,
u2t 2u
+
t reflects the unobserved excess of false negative versus false positive insur-
ance classifications among those whose use of services did not exceed t. In the de-
nominator, u2t + u#
2
t
 
2 u+t + u#
+
t
 
reflects the unobserved excess of false negative
versus false positive insurance classifications within the entire population. Utilization
among the uninsured, PðU# tjI ¼ 0Þ, can be decomposed in a similar fashion.
We now assess what can be learned about D. First, we present ‘‘arbitrary errors’’
bounds that impose no structure on the distribution of false positives and false neg-
atives. This environment that allows for arbitrary error patterns is termed ‘‘corrupt
sampling’’ (Horowitz and Manski 1995). We then consider the identifying power
of assumptions that restrict the patterns of errors. Results in this section also inform
our treatment effect bounds in Section IV.
A. Arbitrary error bounds
Our analytic framework allows us to trace out bounds on our unknown parameters of
interest as function of a researcher’s confidence in reported insurance status. Follow-
ing Horowitz and Manski (1995), we consider a lower bound, v, on the accuracy rate
among unverified cases. Setting v ¼ 1 corresponds to an assumption that reported in-
surance status is always accurate, the implicit assumption in previous analyses. Set-
ting v ¼ 0 corresponds to an assumption that nothing is known about the accuracy of
unverified reports. We will evaluate patterns of identification decay for our parame-
ters of interest as v departs from1.
Since we do not observe true insurance status for unverified responses, the accu-
racy of such responses cannot logically be known. Nevertheless, our empirical anal-
ysis considers four candidates for v: 0.50, 0.84, 0.92, and 1. For the most
conservative value, v ¼ 0:50, the researcher need only make the common classifica-
tion error assumption that accurate responses are more prevalent than reporting errors
(see, for example, Bollinger 1996; Frazis and Loewenstein 2003).
The other candidate thresholds, v ¼ 0:84 and v ¼ 0:92, are derived from studies
that have investigated the reliability of self-reported insurance status in the MEPS
and other surveys. Among the reportedly insured ðI ¼ 1Þ, let R ¼ 1 and M ¼ 1
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denote reported private and public coverage, respectively, and let R and M denote
true coverage. If both private and public coverage are reported in the month, which is
rare, private coverage is assumed to take precedence; in such cases, we label reported
coverage as R ¼ 1 and M ¼ 0 (and analogously for true coverage). Suppressing the
conditioning on Y ¼ 0, the probability of misclassification is given by
PðZ ¼ 0Þ ¼ PðI ¼ 0jR ¼ 1ÞPðR ¼ 1Þ + PðI ¼ 0jM ¼ 1ÞPðM ¼ 1Þ
+ PðR ¼ 1jI ¼ 0ÞPðI ¼ 0Þ + PðM ¼ 1jI ¼ 0ÞPðI ¼ 0Þ:
For the first term, we conservatively allow the proportion that is truly uninsured
among those reporting private coverage, PðI ¼ 0jR ¼ 1Þ, to be as high as the pro-
portion simply lacking private coverage, PðR ¼ 0jR ¼ 1Þ. Similarly, we allow the
true rate of being uninsured among those reporting public coverage,
PðI ¼ 0jM ¼ 1Þ, to be as high as the rate of simply lacking public coverage,
PðM ¼ 0jM ¼ 1Þ. Imposing these inequalities, we can write
PðZ ¼ 1Þ $ v ¼ 12PðR ¼ 0jR ¼ 1ÞPðR ¼ 1Þ2PðM ¼ 0jM ¼ 1ÞPðM ¼ 1Þ
2PðR ¼ 1jI ¼ 0ÞPðI ¼ 0Þ2PðM ¼ 1jI ¼ 0ÞPðI ¼ 0Þ:
The observed probabilities among the unverified cases are PðR ¼ 1Þ ¼ 0:35,
PðM ¼ 1Þ ¼ 0:13, and PðI ¼ 0Þ ¼ 0:51. Estimates of the unobserved contradiction
rates are inferred from other studies. Hill (2007/2008) estimates that the probability
of truly lacking private insurance when it was reported, PðR ¼ 0jR ¼ 1Þ, is about
0.02, with the possibility that it could be as large as 0.12. Our two estimated thresh-
olds, v ¼ 0:84 and v ¼ 0:92, incorporate the larger and smaller values, respectively.
The probability of truly having private insurance when no insurance was reported,
PðR ¼ 1jI ¼ 0Þ, is estimated to be no higher than 0.10.
For both values of n, we assume that the rate of false positives among those report-
ing public coverage, PðM ¼ 0jM ¼ 1Þ, does not exceed 0.03. Card, Hildreth, and
Shore-Sheppard (2004) estimate that the rate of false positives forMedicaid in the SIPP
ranges from 0.01 to 0.03. Like theMEPS, the SIPP is a longitudinal, household survey.
The MEPS and the SIPP also have similar recall periods and yield fairly similar esti-
mates of enrollment in Medicaid and the State Children’s Health Insurance Program
(SCHIP) (Peterson and Grady 2005). Estimates of PðM ¼ 1jI ¼ 0Þ range from 0.02
(for v ¼ 0:92) to 0.12 (for v ¼ 0:84). These values are derived from benchmarking
studies of the MEPS (Banthin and Sing 2006; Nelson 2003; Peterson and Grady
2005), with the lower value reflecting an estimate that most (83 percent) of those
who failed to report their public insurance instead reported private insurance (Call
et al. 2007). Further motivation is provided in an appendix available from the authors.
While we have attempted to be conservative in our derivations of v, these deriva-
tions necessarily involve extrapolating information from respondents for whom val-
idation data are available. Misreporting rates in our sample of unverified respondents
may not reflect estimated misreporting rates in other samples. While the descriptive
utilization gap results presented later in this section are sensitive to values of n, our
main conclusions in Section IVabout the impact of universal health insurance on uti-
lization (which impose additional monotonicity assumptions) are fairly robust to the
choice of v across a wide range of values.
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In Proposition 1, we formalize what can be known about the utilization gap be-
tween the truly insured and truly uninsured given only a lower bound, v, on the frac-
tion of accurate insurance classifications among unverified cases:
Proposition 1: Let PðZ ¼ 1jY ¼ 0Þ$v, and suppose that nothing is known about
the pattern of reporting errors. Then the mean utilization rate among the truly in-
sured is bounded sharply as follows:Z
UdFH # EðUjI ¼ 1Þ #
Z
UdFL
using the distribution functions
FLðtÞ ¼ PðU # t; I ¼ 1Þ 2 a
+
t
PðI ¼ 1Þ2a +t + minffðvÞ2a +t ;PðU . t; I ¼ 0; Y ¼ 0Þg
FHðtÞ ¼ PðU # t; I ¼ 1Þ + a
2
t
PðI ¼ 1Þ + a2t 2minffðvÞ2a2t ;PðU . t; I ¼ 1; Y ¼ 0Þg
and values
at
+ ¼
minffðvÞ;PðU # t; I ¼ 1; Y ¼ 0Þg if dLt , 0
maxf0;minfPðU # t; I ¼ 1; Y ¼ 0Þ;fðvÞ2
PðU . t; I ¼ 0; Y ¼ 0Þgg otherwise
8><
>:
a2t ¼
minffðvÞ;PðU # t; I ¼ 0; Y ¼ 0Þg if dHt $ 0
maxf0;minfPðU # t; I ¼ 0; Y ¼ 0Þ;fðvÞ2
PðU . t; I ¼ 1; Y ¼ 0Þgg otherwise;
8><
>:
where fðvÞ[ ð12vÞPðY ¼ 0Þ. Analogous bounds for the utilization rate among the
uninsured, EðUjI ¼ 0Þ, are obtained by replacing I ¼ 1 with I ¼ 0 and vice versa.
Proof. See Appendix 1.
Notice that increasing v narrows the bounds over some ranges of v but not others, and
the rate of identification decay can be highly nonlinear as v declines. When v ¼ 0,
these bounds can be derived from Horowitz and Manski’s (1998) censored regressor
bounds (their Section 4.1). In that context, some observations of a conditioning vari-
able are missing in the data. Kreider and Pepper’s (2007) Proposition 2 bounds apply
when v ¼ 0 and the outcome U is binary.12
12. Kreider and Pepper (2007) study how labor force participation varies with disability status given a lack
of knowledge of any particular respondent’s true disability status. Our Proposition 1 extends their Propo-
sition 2 by considering continuous outcomes and by assessing identification for values of v greater than 0
within unverified classifications. Their proposition, however, is more general in the dimension that they do
not impose our identifying assumption that all verified cases are accurate; they allow for the possibility of
errors within verified cases.
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We next bound the difference in use between the insured and uninsured. We could
compute a valid lower (upper) bound on the utilization gap, D, by subtracting the Prop-
osition 1 upper (lower) bound on EðUjI ¼ 0Þ from the Proposition 1 lower (upper)
bound on EðUjI ¼ 1Þ. While these bounds on D would be valid, they would not nec-
essarily be as tight as possible. In particular, they would not impose the constraints that
the parameters a+t (a
2
t ) in the Proposition 1 bounds on EðUjI ¼ 1Þ are identical to the
parameters a2t (a
+
t ) in the bounds on EðUjI ¼ 0Þ. Therefore, we compute sharp
bounds on D using numerical methods that impose these constraints.13
B. Arbitrary error results
Table 2 presents estimated bounds on the utilization gap, D, for any use of services,
number of provider visits, and expenditures. The arbitrary error bounds are provided
in Column 1. When v ¼ 1, D is point-identified as the self-reported gap obtained
from taking the data at face value. For example, the gap in the proportion of insured
and uninsured that used services in July 1996 is point-identified as PðU ¼ 1jI ¼
1Þ2PðU ¼ 1jI ¼ 0Þ ¼ 0:098. The gaps in the number of provider visits and expen-
ditures are point identified as 0.186 and $77, respectively. Ninety-five percent confi-
dence intervals for the gap in any use, number of visits, and expenditures are
calculated as ½0.083, 0.112, ½0.136, 0.237, and ½$47, $107, respectively.14
Under arbitrary errors, identification of these utilization gaps deteriorates rapidly
as v departs from 1. For the reference case v ¼ 0.92, for example, the difference in
the number of provider visits per month may lie anywhere between -0.135 and 0.472,
while the difference in expenditures may lie anywhere between -$40 and $117 (Table
2). In neither case is the sign of D identified, even ignoring the additional uncertainty
associated with sampling variability. In fact, without imposing assumptions on the
patterns of errors, we cannot identify whether the insured were more likely to use
services than the uninsured unless v exceeds 0.95 (not shown). Similarly, we cannot
identify whether the insured had more provider visits unless v exceeds 0.98, nor can
we identify whether the insured had greater expenditures unless v exceeds 0.99. This
represents an important negative result: being almost fully confident in the accuracy
of the data is not enough, by itself, to be informative about even the sign of the uti-
lization gap between the insured and uninsured.
C. Restrictions on reporting error patterns
The parameter bounds thus far have allowed for arbitrary patterns of insurance clas-
sification errors, including the possibility that reporting errors are endogenously re-
lated to true insurance status or the healthcare utilization outcome. In contrast, most
economic research presumes that measurement error is exogenous to the extent that
it exists at all. In this section, we make transparent the identifying power of two
common (nonnested) independence assumptions that tighten the Proposition 1
bounds. Then we introduce a weaker alternative assumption that is more plausible
in our context.
13. Gauss programs are available from the authors upon request.
14. Throughout this analysis, we compute confidence intervals around the estimated identification regions
using methods recently developed by Chernozhukov, Hong, and Tamer (2007). We use balanced repeated
replication methods to account for the complex survey design (Wolter 1985).
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First, a researcher might consider an orthogonality assumption that insurance clas-
sification errors arise independently of true insurance status:
PðI ¼ 1jZÞ ¼ PðI ¼ 1Þ:ð4Þ
This assumption may be relatively innocuous compared with the set of homogeneity
and exogeneity assumptions imposed in standard parametric frameworks. Still, sto-
ries can be told in which this assumption may be violated. Reporting errors may
not be orthogonal to true insurance status if, for example, better educated respond-
ents are both more likely to be insured and more likely to accurately answer survey
questions. Similarly, Card, Hildreth, and Shore-Sheppard (2004) provide evidence
that errors in reporting Medicaid coverage vary with family income, which is also
a key aspect of Medicaid eligibility.
Alternatively, or in combination with Equation 4, a researcher might place restric-
tions on the relationship between insurance classification errors and the use of health
services. In the popular classical measurement error framework, reported insurance
status does not depend on the level of healthcare utilization conditional on true in-
surance status:
PðI ¼ 1jI;UÞ ¼ PðI ¼ 1jIÞ for I ¼ 0; 1:ð5Þ
Aigner (1973) and Bollinger (1996) study this type of ‘‘nondifferential’’ classifica-
tion error for the case of a binary conditioning variable. When the independence As-
sumption 5 holds, Bollinger’s Theorem 1 can be used to show that D is bounded
below by the reported utilization gap EðUjI ¼ 1Þ2EðUjI ¼ 0Þ ð.0Þ as long as v ex-
ceeds 0.50. Reflecting well-known attenuation bias associated with random measure-
ment error, the magnitude of the reported utilization gap represents a downward-
biased estimate of the magnitude of the true utilization gap. Berger, Black, and Scott
(1998) impose the nondifferential errors assumption in the only previous economet-
ric analysis that allows for misreported insurance status.
Bound, Brown, and Mathiowetz (2001, p. 3725) note, however, that in general the
nondifferential measurement error assumption is strong and often implausible. In our
context, the nondifferential assumption is most likely to be violated if using health-
care informs respondents about their true insurance status. For example, a healthcare
provider may enroll a patient in Medicaid. More generally, a regular user of health
services (or a user with high expenditures) presumably is more likely to know her
insurance status than an infrequent user of services.
We propose a weaker alternative assumption on the pattern of reporting errors.
Relaxing the nondifferential assumption in Equation 5, we suppose that the probability
of misreporting insurance status does not rise with the level of healthcare utilization:
PðI ¼ 1jI ¼ 0;U1Þ # PðI ¼ 1jI ¼ 0;U0Þ
PðI ¼ 0jI ¼ 1;U1Þ # PðI ¼ 0jI ¼ 1;U0Þ
ð6Þ
for U1$U0. The nondifferential assumption represents a special case. In the next
section, we illustrate how the identifying power of this monotone ‘‘nonincreasing er-
ror rate’’ assumption compares with the standard nondifferential errors assumption.
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D. Restricted error pattern results
Columns 2-4 in Table 2 illustrate the identifying power of these stronger assump-
tions. In each column, restricting the patterns of reporting errors translates into con-
siderably narrower bounds compared with the arbitrary errors case. We focus
primarily on the relatively weak ‘‘nonincreasing errors’’ bounds in Column 4 that
do not require any independence assumptions.15
Recall that we cannot identify the sign of D for provider visits under arbitrary
errors unless at least 98 percent of the unverified responses are known to be accurate;
for expenditures, the corresponding critical value is 99 percent. Under the nonin-
creasing errors assumption, however, the critical values fall dramatically to 78 per-
cent and 64 percent, respectively (not shown). For the reference case v ¼ 0:92
under nonincreasing errors, D is estimated to lie within ½0.133, 0.264 for the mean
number of visits per month and within ½$68, $85 for expenditures (Table 2). These
bounds for visits are 0.066 visits wider than the corresponding nondifferential errors
bounds in Column 3, but they are 0.476 visits narrower than the arbitrary errors
bounds in Column 1. Similarly, the nonincreasing errors bounds for expenditures
are $14 wider than the nondifferential errors bounds, but they are $140 narrower
than the arbitrary errors bounds. The comparisons are similar after accounting for
sampling variability.
IV. Utilization under Universal Health Insurance
We now turn to inferences about healthcare utilization under a hypo-
thetical policy of universal health insurance. Let UðI ¼ 1Þ denote the amount of
health services an individual would have used in July 1996 if insured. This outcome
is observed in the data only for sample members who are verified to be currently in-
sured; it is unobserved for those verified to be uninsured and for those whose insur-
ance status is not verified. We wish to learn the population’s expected utilization if
everyone were insured, E½UðI ¼ 1Þ. If current insurance status were randomly
assigned, then the utilization among the currently insured, EðUjI ¼ 1Þ, would rep-
resent the best prediction of the utilization rate under universal coverage. Since I is
not observed for all individuals, we could instead bound EðUjI ¼ 1Þ using the meth-
ods derived in the previous sections. As discussed earlier, however, the observed dis-
tribution of health insurance coverage in the population is not randomly assigned.
Instead, insurance status is affected by characteristics potentially related to the use
of medical resources.
In the absence of random assignment or other assumptions, the quantity
E½UðI ¼ 1Þ is not identified even if reported insurance status is always accurate.
Unlike identification of the conditional utilization rate EðUjI ¼ 1Þ, identification
of the ‘‘treatment’’ outcome E½UðI ¼ 1Þ requires knowledge about the counterfac-
tual utilization rate of the uninsured had they instead been insured. Uncertainty about
15. We numerically computed bounds under the various assumptions by searching over logically allowed
combinations of false positives and false negatives u2t ; u#
2
t ; u t
+; u#t+
 
:
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the accuracy of reported insurance status, the focus of the current paper, further com-
plicates identification of counterfactuals.
To bound the impact of universal coverage on utilization, we begin by using the
law of total probability to decompose the projected utilization rate under universal
coverage into verified and unverified current insurance status:
E½UðI ¼ 1Þ ¼ E½UðI ¼ 1ÞjY ¼ 1PðY ¼ 1Þ
+ E½UðI ¼ 1ÞjY ¼ 0PðY ¼ 0Þ:
ð7Þ
The data identify PðY ¼ 1Þ and PðY ¼ 0Þ but neither utilization term. The first term
involving verified insurance status can be written as
E½UðI ¼ 1ÞjY ¼ 1 ¼ EðUjI ¼ 1; Y ¼ 1ÞP11
+ E½UðI ¼ 1ÞjI ¼ 0; Y ¼ 1ð12P11Þ
ð8Þ
where P11[PðI ¼ 1jY ¼ 1Þ denotes the status quo insurance rate among verified
cases. All the terms in Equation 8 are observed except for the counterfactual expected
utilization among the uninsured under the status quo, E½UðI ¼ 1ÞjI ¼ 0; Y ¼ 1.
Without additional assumptions, this quantity may lie anywhere within the support
of U, ½0; supU.
Returning to Equation 7 and decomposing the third term involving the unverified
cases obtains
E½UðI ¼ 1ÞjY ¼ 0 ¼ EðUjI ¼ 1; Y ¼ 0ÞP10
+ E½UðI ¼ 1ÞjI ¼ 0; Y ¼ 0ð12P10Þ
ð9Þ
where P10[PðI ¼ 1jY ¼ 0Þ is the status quo insurance rate among unverified
cases. None of the quantities in Equation 9 are identified. We do not know P10,
and we cannot match healthcare use outcomes to insurance status when insurance
status is unknown. Introducing this framework under the implicit assumption that
v ¼ 0, Molinari’s (Forthcoming) innovative analysis shows that we can learn some-
thing about the first term, EðUjI ¼ 1; Y ¼ 0Þ, if the researcher has outside informa-
tion restricting the range of P10 (denoted p in her framework).
16 She estimates the
treatment effect of drug use on employment when drug use is unobserved for part
of the sample. We extend her analysis in two dimensions when v. 0.
First, an assumption on v translates into internally generated restrictions on P10 as
a function of v. We can write the unobserved insurance rate among unverified cases,
P10, as a function of the reported rate and unobserved misclassification rates:
P10 ¼ PðI ¼ 1jY ¼ 0Þ
+ PðI ¼ 0; Z ¼ 0jY ¼ 0Þ2PðI ¼ 1; Z ¼ 0jY ¼ 0Þ:
Allowing the unidentified terms to vary over their feasible ranges obtains
P10 2 ½P10;P10 where
16. In Molinari’s framework, Y ¼ 0 (our notation) denotes survey nonresponse instead of lack of verifica-
tion. Molinari (2008) presents a general treatment of the identification problem for a variety of measure-
ment issues.
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P10[PðI ¼ 1jY ¼ 0Þ2minf12v;PðI ¼ 1jY ¼ 0Þg
P10[PðI ¼ 1jY ¼ 0Þ + minf12v;PðI ¼ 0jY ¼ 0Þg:
ð10Þ
When v ¼ 0, P10 is trivially bounded to lie within ½0; 1; at the other extreme when
v ¼ 1, P10 ¼ PðI ¼ 1jY ¼ 0Þ.
Second, considering a positive value of v allows us to restrict the expected utiliza-
tion rate among the unverifiably truly uninsured, EðUjI ¼ 0; Y ¼ 0Þ, which in turn
allows us to tighten Molinari’s bounds on the expected utilization rate among the
unverifiably truly insured, EðUjI ¼ 1; Y ¼ 0Þ. Her framework can be used to pro-
vide sharp bounds at v ¼ 0 and v ¼ 1. Proposition 2 allows us to fill in identification
patterns for values of v between 0 and 1. For a particular value of v, we can bound the
population’s use of health services under universal coverage as follows:17
Proposition 2. Given PðZ ¼ 1jY ¼ 0Þ$ v and a known value P10 2 ½P10ðvÞ;
P10ðvÞ, the population’s healthcare utilization rate under mandatory universal in-
surance coverage is sharply bounded as follows:
EðUjI ¼ 1; Y ¼ 1ÞPðI ¼ 1; Y ¼ 1Þ + P10PðY ¼ 0Þ
Z
UdGH
# E½UðI ¼ 1Þ #
EðUjI ¼ 1; Y ¼ 1ÞPðI ¼ 1; Y ¼ 1Þ + P10PðY ¼ 0Þ
Z
UdGL
+ PðI ¼ 0; Y ¼ 1Þ + ð12P10ÞPðY ¼ 0Þ½ supU
ð11Þ
where
GLðt; vÞ[max 0;PðU # tjY ¼ 0Þ2ð12P10ÞV2ðt; vÞ
P10
 
GHðt; vÞ[min PðU # tjY ¼ 0Þ2ð12P10ÞV1ðt; vÞ
P10
; 1
 
;
V1ðt; vÞ[PðU # t; I ¼ 0; Y ¼ 0Þ2Qt
2
ð12P10ÞPðY ¼ 0Þ ; V2ðt; vÞ[
PðU # t; I ¼ 0; Y ¼ 0Þ + Q +t
ð12P10ÞPðY ¼ 0Þ ;
Q
+
t [minffðvÞ;PðU # t; I ¼ 1; Y ¼ 0Þ; ð12P10ÞPðY ¼ 0Þ
2PðU # t; I ¼ 0; Y ¼ 0Þg; and
Qt
2
[minffðvÞ;PðU # t; I ¼ 0; Y ¼ 0Þg:
17. This analysis does not account for potential increases in gross prices for healthcare resulting from uni-
versal coverage. Since such price increases would not increase utilization, these upper bounds on
EðUjI ¼ 1Þ should still apply. For our main analysis, we also assume that insurance coverage to the unin-
sured would be representative of the current mix of public and private coverage available to the insured.
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If P10 is unknown, the lower and upper bounds in Equation 11 are replaced by the
infimum and supremum, respectively, of these bounds over values of P10 2 ½P10;P10.
Proof: See Appendix 1.
The proof follows the general outline of Molinari’s (Forthcoming) Proposition 1 der-
ivation. Her Proposition 1 is similar except that her counterparts for the probability
distributions GL and GH implicitly assume that v ¼ 0 such that nothing is known
about the reliability of unverified classifications. For that case, the bounds in Equa-
tion 11 collapse to her bounds after setting V1ðt; vÞ ¼ 0, V2ðt; vÞ ¼ 1, and
½P10;P10 ¼ ½0; 1. She also allows for the possibility that the researcher has outside
information restricting P10 to a range narrower than ½0; 1, including the possibility
that P10 is known. In that case, something can be learned about E½UðI ¼ 1Þj
Y ¼ 0 even though V1 ¼ 0 and V2 ¼ 1. Her bounds are as narrow as possible given
her imposed assumptions.
In the special case that current insurance status is known to be accurately mea-
sured (v ¼ 1), the Proposition 2 bounds collapse to the following well-known bounds
(Manski 1995):
EðUjI ¼ 1ÞPðI ¼ 1Þ # E UðI ¼ 1Þ½  # EðUjI ¼ 1ÞPðI ¼ 1Þ + PðI ¼ 0ÞsupU:
Given the absence of reporting errors in this case, the width of these bounds depends
only on the proportion uninsured, PðI ¼ 0Þ, and the uninsured’s upper bound use of
services in the counterfactual state of being insured, supU.
For the binary utilization case, supU in Proposition 2 is naturally set equal to 1.
Yet there is no natural limit to the number of provider visits or dollars spent on med-
ical services. Unless a researcher is nevertheless willing to set an upper bound on U,
it must be recognized that an informative upper bound on E½UðI ¼ 1Þ cannot be
logically identified under the weak conditions specified in Proposition 2. For our
Proposition 2 empirical results, we set supU to 1.82 for number of visits and to
$862 for expenditures reflecting mean values among individuals who (1) perceived
themselves to be in poor health at the time of the first interview and (2) were verified
to be privately insured. These values reflect the 92nd percentile for visits and the 98th
percentile for expenditures. We do not require any assumptions on supU for the
Proposition 3 bounds or monotone instrumental variable (MIV) bounds that follow.
We conservatively treat the insurance rate among unverified classifications, P10, as
unknown. Therefore, we allow this value to lie anywhere within its logically consis-
tent range ½P10;P10, conditional on v (see the last part of Proposition 2).
A. Monotonicity Assumptions
The preceding bounds can be narrowed substantially under common monotonicity
assumptions on treatment response and treatment selection. The monotone treatment
response assumption (MTR), introduced by Manski (1997), specifies that an individ-
ual’s utilization is at least as high in the insured state as in the uninsured state:
UiðI ¼ 1Þ $ UiðI ¼ 0Þ:ð12Þ
Given moral hazard, we would expect some individuals to increase their use of health
services upon becoming insured; presumably, the use of services would not decline.
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Under a monotone treatment selection (MTS) assumption introduced in Manski and
Pepper (2000), expected utilization under either ‘‘treatment’’ (insured or uninsured)
would be at least as high among the currently insured as among the currently uninsured:
E½UðI ¼ jÞjI ¼ 1 $ E½UðI ¼ jÞjI ¼ 0 for j ¼ 0; 1:ð13Þ
The MTS assumption is related to adverse selection: those who have self-selected
themselves into the insured state may tend to be more prone to use health services
than their uninsured counterparts.18 While the MTS assumption would presumably
not hold for certain subpopulations, we only require that the tendency holds on av-
erage for the nonelderly population as a whole.
In support of the aggregate MTS assumption, public insurance programs already
cover some of the least healthy populations. For example, people with substantial
disabilities (who typically need considerable healthcare) are often insured by Med-
icaid or Medicare. Most states also use the Medicaid medically needy option to pro-
vide coverage to families with children whose healthcare expenditures are quite
substantial relative to their incomes. More generally, those at relatively low risk of
needing health services are less likely to seek coverage, as are people less predis-
posed to seek health services. For example, low demand for insurance may partly re-
flect preferences for avoiding medical care (Vistnes and Monheit 2008). Using the
Community Tracking Household Survey, Hirth et al. (2006) estimate that 86 percent
of workers who were not offered insurance at their job have low demand for insur-
ance. Compared with workers who are offered insurance at their job, they find that
workers who are not offered insurance tend to be younger, have lower family
incomes, and have less education – all factors associated with lower healthcare use. In
contrast, however, some of the uninsured may have found it difficult to obtain insurance
at affordable prices due to preexisting conditions. Yet while medical underwriting can be
a barrier to obtaining private insurance, data from the 1996 MEPS indicate that less than 3
percent of uninsured adults were ‘‘ever denied health insurance because of poor health.’’
Some evidence of aggregate adverse selection has been reported in parametric stud-
ies of the effects of insurance. Using data from theMEPS to estimate amodel of private
insurance coverage and office-based doctor visits, Deb,Munkin, and Trivedi (2006) find
that half of the observed lower healthcare use among uninsured adults compared with
privately insured adults can be attributed to self-selection rather than the lack of insur-
ance. Dor, Sudano, and Baker (2006) find similar evidence of selection into private in-
surance.19 If aggregate MTS does not hold in the population, however, then the
Proposition 3 upper bound (see below) reverts to the Proposition 2 upper bound.
When both MTR and MTS hold, a result in Manski and Pepper (2000, Corollary
2.2) implies
EðUÞ # E½UðI ¼ 1Þ # EðUjI ¼ 1Þ:ð14Þ
18. The MTS assumption relaxes the commonly imposed ‘‘exogenous treatment selection’’ (ETS) assump-
tion, E½UðI ¼ jÞjI ¼ 1 ¼ E½UðI ¼ jÞjI ¼ 0 for j ¼ f0; 1g; that assumes away the possibility of self-
selection (see Manski and Pepper 2000, p. 1001).
19. However, the findings by Deb, Munkin, and Trivedi (2006) and Dor, Sudano, and Baker (2006) rely in
part on the types of parametric assumptions we are trying to avoid.
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The lower bound on the population’s use of services under universal coverage is
E(U), the status quo national utilization rate in the absence of universal coverage.
The upper bound is the status quo utilization rate among those currently insured. This
result combined with the upper bound on EðUjI ¼ 1Þ derived in Proposition 1 leads
to the following proposition:
Proposition 3. Suppose that the MTR and MTS assumptions hold across the pop-
ulation and PðZ ¼ 1jY ¼ 0Þ$v. Then the expected use of services under insurance
coverage is bounded above by
R
UdFL where
FLðtÞ ¼ PðU # t; I ¼ 1Þ2a
+
t
PðI ¼ 1Þ2at+ + minffðvÞ2at+ ;PðU. t; I ¼ 0; Y ¼ 0Þg;
at
+ ¼
minffðvÞ;PðU # t; I ¼ 1; Y ¼ 0Þg if dLt,0
maxf0;minfPðU # t; I ¼ 1; Y ¼ 0Þ;fðvÞ
2PðU. t; I ¼ 0; Y ¼ 0Þgg otherwise
8><
>:
and dLt [PðU# t; I ¼ 1Þ2PðU. t; I ¼ 1Þ2fðvÞ.
In the empirical work that follows, we also consider the additional identifying power
of the independence and nonincreasing errors assumptions considered in Section
IIIC.
B. Universal Coverage Results
The fraction of the nonelderly population that used health services in July 1996 was
0.206, and the mean number of provider visits and expenditures were 0.412 and $99,
respectively. We are interested in placing worst-case bounds on average utilization
outcomes under a policy of mandated health insurance coverage. Our main analysis
presumes that new coverage extended to the uninsured would be representative of the
current mix of public and private coverage available to the insured. Later, we con-
sider policies that would cover the uninsured by expanding public programs.
In the absence of monotonicity or independence assumptions, the Proposition 2
bounds apply. Point estimates of these bounds, along with 95 percent confidence
intervals, are presented in Table 3, Column 1. Under the standard implicit assumption
that insurance status is reported accurately, v ¼ 1, we estimate that the fraction of the
nonelderly population using health services in July if everyone became insured
would lie in the range ½0.182, 0.374, with 95 percent confidence interval ½0.173,
0.383. In percentage terms, the impact would lie within the range ½-12 percent,
+82 percent, with 95 percent confidence interval ½-16 percent, +86 percent. The es-
timated upper bounds on mean provider visits and expenditures per month are 0.712
(+73 percent) and $258 (+161 percent), respectively, which rise to 0.735 (+78 per-
cent) and $281 (+184 percent) after accounting for sampling variability. In each case,
the identification uncertainty associated with unknown counterfactual outcomes is
much greater than the uncertainty associated with sampling variability. Clearly, we
cannot learn much about the impact of universal coverage without imposing stronger
assumptions, even if there is no uncertainty about the accuracy of status quo classi-
fications. Figures 1-3 trace out the 95 percent confidence intervals for any use, visits,
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and expenditures, respectively, across all values of n between 0.5 and 1. As v departs
from 1, the Proposition 2 bounds naturally become even wider.
The Proposition 3 bounds apply when MTR and MTS are imposed. As seen in
Table 3, Column 2 and the figures, the bounds narrow dramatically compared with
Figure 1
Bounds on the Fraction of the Nonelderly Population that Would Have Used Any
Hospital or Ambulatory Services If the Uninsured Had a Mix of Private and Public
Insurance, July 1996
Notes: MTR ¼ monotone treatment response: an uninsured individual’s use would not decline if she
became insured. MTS ¼ monotone treatment selection: under universal coverage, the currently in-
sured would use at least as much services as the currently uninsured. Orthogonal errors imposes
P(I*¼1jZ*¼0) ¼P(I*¼1jZ*¼1), nondifferential errors imposes P(I ¼1jI*) ¼ P(I ¼1jI*,U), and nonin-
creasing error rates imposes P(I ¼1jI*¼0,U1) # P(I ¼1jI*¼0,U0) and P(I ¼1jI*¼0,U1) #
P(I ¼1jI*¼0,U0) for U1 $ U0 where U ¼ use, visits, or expenditures; I* ¼ true insurance status;
I ¼ reported insurance status; Z* ¼ 1 if I* ¼ I. Vertical dotted lines reflect proposed values of v mo-
tivated in the text. Insurance status is verified for 67% of the sample. Confidence intervals for the
bounds were computed using methods provided by Chernozhukov, Hong, and Tamer (2007).
Data: Medical Expenditure Panel Survey Household Component and linked Insurance Component,
1996. Sample members age 0 to 64 as of July, 1996.
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Column 1. The lower bounds rise to the status quo utilization rates of 0.412 visits and
$99 per month. Similarly, the upper bounds decline, but they continue to depend on
the value of v. When v ¼ 0:92, for example, the mean number of visits under univer-
sal coverage would rise to no more than 0.503 (a 22 percent increase), while per cap-
ita expenditures would rise to no more than $124 (a 25 percent increase).
Figure 2
Bounds on the Nonelderly Population’s Mean Number of Provider Visits If the
Uninsured Had a Mix of Private and Public Insurance, July 1996
Notes: MTR ¼ monotone treatment response: an uninsured individual’s use would not decline if she
became insured. MTS ¼ monotone treatment selection: under universal coverage, the currently in-
sured would use at least as much services as the currently uninsured. Orthogonal errors imposes
P(I*¼1jZ*¼0) ¼P(I*¼1jZ*¼1), nondifferential errors imposes P(I ¼1jI*) ¼ P(I ¼1jI*,U), and nonin-
creasing error rates imposes P(I ¼1jI*¼0,U1) # P(I ¼1jI*¼0,U0) and P(I ¼1jI*¼0,U1) #
P(I ¼1jI*¼0,U0) for U1 $ U0 where U ¼ use, visits, or expenditures; I* ¼ true insurance status;
I ¼ reported insurance status; Z* ¼ 1 if I* ¼ I. Vertical dotted lines reflect proposed values of v mo-
tivated in the text. Insurance status is verified for 67% of the sample. Confidence intervals for the
bounds were computed using methods provided by Chernozhukov, Hong, and Tamer (2007).
Data: Medical Expenditure Panel Survey Household Component and linked Insurance Component,
1996. Sample members age 0 to 64 as of July, 1996.
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These bounds can be narrowed further under stronger assumptions about the pat-
terns of reporting errors. Columns 3 and 4 in Table 3 present bounds on E½UðI ¼ 1Þ
under the orthogonality and nondifferential errors assumptions, respectively, dis-
cussed in Section IIIC. We focus especially on the more plausible ‘‘nonincreasing
errors’’ assumption in which the prevalence of insurance status misreporting falls
Figure 3
Bounds on the Nonelderly Population’s Mean Hospital and Ambulatory Expenditures
If the Uninsured Had a Mix of Private and Public Insurance, July 1996
Notes: MTR ¼ monotone treatment response: an uninsured individual’s use would not decline if she
became insured. MTS ¼ monotone treatment selection: under universal coverage, the currently in-
sured would use at least as much services as the currently uninsured. Orthogonal errors imposes
P(I*¼1jZ*¼0) ¼P(I*¼1jZ*¼1), nondifferential errors imposes P(I ¼1jI*) ¼ P(I ¼1jI*,U), and nonin-
creasing error rates imposes P(I ¼1jI*¼0,U1) # P(I ¼1jI*¼0,U0) and P(I ¼1jI*¼0,U1) #
P(I ¼1jI*¼0,U0) for U1 $ U0 where U ¼ use, visits, or expenditures; I* ¼ true insurance status;
I ¼ reported insurance status; Z* ¼ 1 if I* ¼ I. Vertical dotted lines reflect proposed values of v mo-
tivated in the text. Insurance status is verified for 67% of the sample. Confidence intervals for the
bounds were computed using methods provided by Chernozhukov, Hong, and Tamer (2007).
Data: Medical Expenditure Panel Survey Household Component and linked Insurance Component,
1996. Sample members age 0 to 64 as of July, 1996.
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weakly with the level of utilization. These results are presented in Column 5. When
v ¼ 0:92, the mean number of visits per month among the nonelderly population
would rise to no more than 0.463 (a 12 percent increase) under universal coverage,
while per capita monthly expenditures would rise to no more than $117 (an 18 per-
cent increase).
C. Monotone Instrumental Variables
We next use monotone instrumental variables (MIV) techniques developed by Manski
and Pepper (2000) and extended by Kreider and Pepper (2007) to assess how the
Proposition 3 bounds can be narrowed when combined with monotonicity assump-
tions linking utilization outcomes and observed covariates such as age or health sta-
tus. Consider age and use of health services. The incidence of many health conditions
rises with age, and many health conditions are persistent once developed. These ten-
dencies suggest that, on average, utilization among adults under universal coverage
would be nondecreasing in age. If this assumption holds, then we can improve upon
the previously derived bounds by enforcing the restriction that upper bounds identi-
fied for younger groups cannot exceed upper bounds identified for older groups.
We treat age and general health status as MIVs. We divide the population into 18
age groups: 0-30, 31-32, 33-34,., 63-64.20 Within each age group, we assume that
use of services under universal coverage would be nondecreasing in reported worse
general health across the following categories: poor/fair, good, very good, and excel-
lent. Formally, consider the utilization rate within some age group, age# (the exten-
sion to multiple MIV dimensions is straightforward). The age MIVassumption implies
the following inequality restriction:
age1 # age# # age20E UðI ¼ 1Þjage1Þ½ 
# E UðI ¼ 1Þjage#Þ½  # E UðI ¼ 1Þjage2Þ½ :
ð15Þ
This mean monotonicity condition for an instrument relaxes the more typical (and
stronger) mean independence assumption. Under mean independence, the inequal-
ities across the expectations in Equation 15 would be replaced with equalities (Manski
and Pepper 2000). In our application, however, it is not obvious where to find instru-
ments that would satisfy mean independence.
The conditional expectations in Equation 15 are not identified, but they can be
bounded using the methods described above. Let LB(age) and UB(age) be the known
lower and upper bounds, respectively, given the available information on EðUj
I; ageÞ; in computing these bounds, we assume that MTR and MTS continue to
hold. (Under the MTS assumption, note that the treatment I* is itself an MIV.) Then
using Manski and Pepper (2000, Proposition 1), we have
20. For the youngest group, we conservatively choose an age range that extends well into adulthood. New-
borns tend to use substantial care, but then the use of services tends to decline with a child’s age as the
frequency of recommended preventive care visits decreases. Use of services tends to rise again in adulthood
with the onset of chronic conditions.
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sup
age1 # age#
LBðage1Þ # E½UðI ¼ 1Þjage#Þ # inf
age2 $ age#
UBðage2Þ:ð16Þ
The MIV bound on expected utilization under universal coverage is obtained using
the law of total probability:
+
age#
Pðage ¼ age#Þf sup
age1 # age#
LBðage1Þg # E½UðI ¼ 1Þ
# +
age#
Pðage ¼ age#Þf inf
age2 $ age#
UBðage2Þg:
ð17Þ
Thus, to find the MIV bounds on the utilization rate, one takes the appropriate
weighted average of the lower and upper bounds across the different values of the
instrument. This MIV estimator is consistent but biased in finite samples. To account
for this bias, we employ Kreider and Pepper’s (2007) modified MIV estimator that
estimates and adjusts for finite-sample bias.21
While there is substantial debate in the literature about the appropriateness of self-
reported health variables in regression models of employment (see, for example,
Bound 1991), the MIV assumption does not require reported health status to be an
unbiased indicator of true health status or to be exogenously reported. What is re-
quired is that utilization under universal coverage would be nondecreasing in age
and reported health status.22
The MIV assumptions cannot be verified by the data because the expectations in
Equation 15 involve unobserved counterfactual utilization outcomes; moreover, we
do not observe status quo insurance status in the presence of reporting errors. The
joint assumption that v ¼ 1 and MIV-MTS hold, however, potentially can be rejected
by the data using a test similar to one suggested by Manski and Pepper (2000, foot-
note 9). For each age group, agej, and health category, Hk, the following inequalities
must hold:
EðUjI ¼ 1; agej;HkÞ[E½UðI ¼ 1ÞjI ¼ 1; agej;Hk
# E½UðI ¼ 1ÞjI ¼ 1; agej#;Hk#[EðUjI ¼ 1; agej#;Hk#Þ for j # j#; k # k#:
Thus, in the absence of measurement error, E(UjI ¼ 1; agej; Hk) should be mono-
tonic in age and reported health. For each pair of adjacent age and health status
groups among the reportedly insured, we conducted a one-sided test of whether uti-
lization is decreasing in age and/or in worse health. We conducted identical tests for
21. See Kreider and Pepper (2007) for estimation details.
22. Health status is routinely included as an explanatory variable in parametric studies of the effects of in-
surance on service use and expenditures, along with an implicit assumption of homogeneity of effects
across individuals. While reported health status is difficult to quantify in surveys and may be mismeasured,
reported general health has external validity in that it predicts mortality and changes in functioning (Idler
and Benyamini 1997; Idler and Kasl 1995). We do not use reports of chronic conditions, which tend to be
misreported; the uninsured are especially likely to underreport conditions because they are less likely to
seek care and acquire diagnoses (Baker, Stabile, and Deri 2004; Miller, Banthin, and Moeller 2004).
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the probability of service use, number of visits, and expenditures. One test for visits
was rejected at the 5 percent significance level, but this is not statistically significant
after accounting for the multiplicity of tests. As seen in Table 4, the nonelderly pop-
ulation’s use of hospital or ambulatory services among the reportedly insured is
roughly monotonic in age and perceived health status. After accounting for sampling
variability, we cannot reject the hypothesis that utilization is monotonic in these
attributes. This is consistent with the many studies that have found that reported
health status strongly predicts service use and expenditures (Balkrishnan, Anderson,
and Bowton 2000; Bierman et al. 1999; DeSalvo et al. 2005; Miilupalo et al. 1997).
D. MIV Results
MIV results are presented in the last two columns of Table 3, assuming MTR and
MTS continue to hold. The identifying power of the MIVassumption can be assessed
by comparing Columns 2 and 6 for the case of arbitrary error patterns and by com-
paring Columns 5 and 7 for the case of ‘‘nonincreasing errors.’’ We focus on the lat-
ter comparison for v ¼ 0:92. In Column 5, we estimate that the fraction of the
nonelderly population using health services in a month would rise no more than
13 percent above the status quo to 0.232. Under the additional MIV assumption in
Column 7, we estimate that this fraction would rise no more than 9 percent to
0.224. Improvements in the upper bounds for mean number of visits and expendi-
tures are similar. Under the MIVassumption, the upper bound on the number of visits
per month improves from 0.463 to 0.444, and the upper bound on expenditures
improves from $117 to $115. Thus, in this setting, visits would increase no more than
8 percent under universal coverage and expenditures per capita would increase no
Table 4
Percent of Reportedly Insured, Nonelderly Population Using Hospital or Physician
Services by Age and Perceived Health Status, July 1996
Perceived Health Status
Age Excellent Very Good Good Poor or Fair
0 to 29 16.1 17.4 23.6 29.7
30 to 34 15.2 21.1 21.6 40.5
35 to 40 16.9 20.4 29.4 41.4
40 to 44 18.3 22.8 27.4 42.1
45 to 50 18.4 27.2 26.8 49.8
50 to 54 20.2 28.0 26.5 51.2
55 to 60 30.4 29.3 32.7 46.0
60 to 64 24.2 35.8 38.4 52.6
Data: Medical Expenditure Panel Survey Household Component (1996). Sample members age 0 to 64 as of
July, 1996 reportedly covered by insurance.
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more than 16 percent. In what follows, we refer to these estimates as our preferred
bounds.
E. Expanding Public Coverage
To this point, our analysis presumes that the package of health benefits made avail-
able to the uninsured under universal coverage would reflect the mixture of benefits
available to the privately and publicly insured under the status quo. Many recent pro-
posals for extending health insurance to the uninsured, however, involve expansions
of existing public programs like Medicaid. As part of our sensitivity analysis, we in-
vestigate how the estimated bounds in Table 3 would change if we focus attention on
policies that would cover the uninsured through expansions of public insurance. To
do so, we repeat the preceding nonparametric bounds analysis over the subsample of
individuals classified as uninsured or publicly insured. Within this subsample, we es-
timate upper bounds on utilization under a policy that extends public insurance to the
uninsured. Upper-bound utilization rates (for any use, visits, and expenditures) for
the entire nonelderly population are then computed as a weighted average of these
upper bounds for the non-privately insured and the status quo utilization rates of
the privately insured.
This approach requires two simplifying assumptions. First, we assume that reports
of private coverage are accurate; any insurance classification errors are confined to
errors among the reportedly uninsured and publicly insured. For cases in which val-
idation data are available in the MEPS, Hill (2007/2008) finds that private insurance
is very accurately reported—most respondents are aware of whether they have pri-
vate coverage. In contrast, there is evidence of more extensive misreporting of public
coverage in surveys (Call et al. 2007; Card, Hildreth, Shore-Sheppard 2004; Davern
et al. 2007). In our restricted sample that excludes the privately insured, the propor-
tion of inaccurate insurance classifications is likely to be higher. To account for this
greater uncertainty, we replace the thresholds v ¼ 0:92 and v ¼ 0:84 considered in
the main analysis with the lower thresholds v ¼ 0:89 and v ¼ 0:77.
Second, our approach presumes that service use by the currently privately insured
would not rise due to the expansion of public insurance. Like the studies by Hadley
and Holahan (2003) and Miller, Banthin, and Moeller (2004), we do not attempt to
estimate the potential consequences of ‘‘crowd out’’ in which some people with pri-
vate coverage might switch to the newly available public coverage. Based on the lit-
erature reviewed by Duchovny and Nelson (2007), switchers from private policies
would likely comprise between a quarter to a half of new enrollees under an ex-
panded public insurance program. Our derived upper bounds in this section are valid
if the switchers would use no more care, on average, under their new public policies.
While public programs that require small or no premium payments are potentially
attractive to many private policyholders, a priori it is not clear whether on balance
differences in benefits and providers would differentially attract less healthy, pri-
vately insured people to public coverage or repel them. Medicaid and SCHIP pro-
grams tend to have generous cost sharing and cover more services than private
insurance, which would disproportionately attract the less healthy. On the other hand,
Medicaid typically pays providers lower fees than private insurance, and lower fees
reduce provider willingness to participate in the Medicaid program and reduce
438 The Journal of Human Resources
enrollees’ access to care (Cohen 1993; Mitchell 1991).23 Econometric studies find
similar access to care in public and private programs (Long, Coughlin, and Kling
2005; Selden and Hudson 2006), which suggests that any incentive or disincentive
for less healthy individuals to switch from private to public coverage is likely
small.24 If, on balance, healthier privately insured people (or people otherwise less
prone to use care) would be attracted to public coverage, then our estimates remain
valid upper bounds. If the opposite is true, then the bounds depend on supU and
hence would be wide.
Table 5 presents our estimated upper bounds on the impacts of expanding public
coverage. The estimates are broadly similar to those presented in Table 3, but the up-
per bounds that incorporate MTR and MTS are uniformly higher for a given degree
of confidence in the data. These higher values do not imply that healthcare expenses
would necessarily be higher under public expansions than under a mixture of public
and private expansions. Instead, the higher upper bounds reflect more uncertainty about
the impacts of public expansions. Recall from Table 1 that the status quo use of health
services is greater among the publicly insured than among the privately insured. These
differences are reflected in the upper bounds. Moreover, the confidence intervals are
wider for expanding public coverage than for covering the uninsured with a mix of pri-
vate and public insurance. These wider intervals reflect smaller samples of people
reporting public coverage than people reporting any insurance.
When v ¼ 1 and the MIVassumption is not imposed, the upper bound on the mean
number of monthly provider visits per month by the nonelderly population under uni-
versal coverage rises from 0.448 with a mix of private and public coverage (Table 3)
to 0.473 with expanded public coverage (Table 5). The upper bound on mean
monthly expenditures rises from $114 to $121. When the MIV assumption is addi-
tionally imposed, the upper bound on visits rises from 0.440 to 0.457, and the upper
bound on expenditures rises from $114 to $120. Our preferred results presented in
Column 7 impose MIV with nonincreasing errors. When v ¼ 0:89, the fraction of
the nonelderly population using services during a month under expanded public in-
surance would rise no more than 14 percent to 0.235, the mean number of monthly
visits would rise no more than 22 percent to 0.503, and mean monthly expenditures
would rise no more than 26 percent to $125.
V. Comparisons with Parametric Studies
Parametric point estimates of increased healthcare utilization under
universal coverage lie within our preferred estimated bounds. These estimates, which
impose MTR, MTS, MIV, and ‘‘nonincreasing errors,’’ are reported in Table 3, Col-
umn 7 with v ¼ 0:92 when expanded coverage involves a mixture of public and
23. Hadley and Holahan (2003/2004) provide evidence that public coverage reduces health expenditures
relative to private coverage, consistent with lower fees paid to providers by Medicaid than by private in-
surance.
24. Several econometric studies of service use find no differential impact of private relative to public cov-
erage for a variety of populations and measures of service use (Glied et al. 1998; Hadley and Holahan 2003;
Kaestner 1999; Long, Coughlin, and Kling 2005; Selden and Hudson 2006).
Kreider and Hill 439
T
a
b
le
5
U
p
p
er
B
o
u
n
d
s
o
n
th
e
M
o
n
th
ly
U
ti
li
za
ti
o
n
R
a
te
o
f
th
e
N
o
n
el
d
er
ly
P
o
p
u
la
ti
on
If
th
e
U
n
in
su
re
d
B
ec
a
m
e
P
u
b
li
cl
y
In
su
re
d
,
Ju
ly
1
9
9
6
A
ss
u
m
in
g
M
o
n
o
to
n
e
T
re
at
m
en
t
R
es
p
o
n
se
(M
T
R
)
an
d
M
o
n
o
to
n
e
T
re
at
m
en
t
S
el
ec
ti
o
n
(M
T
S
)
W
it
h
N
o
M
o
no
to
n
e
In
st
ru
m
en
ta
l
V
ar
ia
b
le
s
(M
IV
)
an
d
th
e
F
o
ll
ow
in
g
P
at
te
rn
s
o
f
In
su
ra
n
ce
C
la
ss
ifi
ca
ti
o
n
E
rr
o
rs
:
W
it
h
A
g
e
an
d
H
ea
lt
h
M
IV
:
L
ow
er
B
ou
n
d
o
n
th
e
P
ro
p
o
rt
io
n
o
f
U
nv
er
ifi
ed
C
as
es
R
ep
o
rt
ed
A
cc
u
ra
te
ly
(v
)
(1
)
A
rb
it
ra
ry
E
rr
o
rs
,
N
o
M
o
no
to
n
ic
it
y
A
ss
u
m
p
ti
on
s
(2
)
A
rb
it
ra
ry
E
rr
o
rs
(3
)
O
rt
h
og
o
n
al
E
rr
o
rs
(4
)
N
o
n
d
if
fe
re
n
ti
al
E
rr
o
rs
(5
)
N
o
n
in
cr
ea
si
n
g
in
U
ti
li
za
ti
o
n
(6
)
A
rb
it
ra
ry
E
rr
o
rs
(7
)
N
o
n
in
cr
ea
si
n
g
in
U
ti
li
za
ti
o
n
I.
P
ro
ba
b
il
it
y
o
f
U
si
ng
A
ny
H
o
sp
it
al
o
r
A
m
bu
la
to
ry
S
er
v
ic
es
(s
ta
tu
s
q
u
o
¼
0
.2
06
)
v
¼1
[0
.1
8
2,
0
.3
74
]†
0
.2
30
0
.2
3
0
0
.2
30
0
.2
3
0
0
.2
24
0
.2
24
[0
.1
7
3
0
.3
83
]‡
0
.2
38
0
.2
3
8
0
.2
38
0
.2
3
8
0
.2
34
0
.2
34
v
¼0
.8
9
[0
.1
7
1,
0
.4
05
]
0
.2
67
0
.2
5
8
0
.2
39
0
.2
4
9
0
.2
59
0
.2
35
[0
.1
6
1
0
.4
15
]
0
.2
75
0
.2
6
6
0
.2
48
0
.2
5
8
0
.2
70
0
.2
50
v
¼0
.7
7
[0
.1
7
1,
0
.4
05
]
0
.2
94
0
.2
8
7
0
.2
48
0
.2
5
8
0
.2
81
0
.2
44
[0
.1
6
1
0
.4
15
]
0
.3
03
0
.2
9
7
0
.2
57
0
.2
6
7
0
.2
93
0
.2
56
v
¼0
.5
0
[0
.1
7
1,
0
.4
05
]
0
.2
99
0
.2
8
7
0
.2
50
0
.2
5
8
0
.2
89
0
.2
47
[0
.1
6
1
0
.4
15
]
0
.3
09
0
.2
9
7
0
.2
59
0
.2
6
8
0
.3
02
0
.2
60
II
.
M
ea
n
N
u
m
b
er
o
f
V
is
it
s
(s
ta
tu
s
q
u
o
¼
0
.4
12
)
v
¼1
[0
.3
5
8,
0
.7
08
]
0
.4
73
0
.4
7
3
0
.4
73
0
.4
7
3
0
.4
57
0
.4
57
[0
.3
3
5
0
.7
32
]
0
.4
97
0
.4
9
7
0
.4
97
0
.4
9
7
0
.4
83
0
.4
83
v
¼0
.8
9
[0
.3
3
5,
0
.7
70
]
0
.5
87
0
.5
3
4
0
.4
93
0
.5
1
8
0
.5
72
0
.5
03
[0
.3
1
4
0
.7
91
]
0
.6
14
0
.5
6
1
0
.5
17
0
.5
4
7
0
.6
04
0
.5
36
v
¼0
.7
7
[0
.3
3
5,
0
.7
89
]
0
.6
83
0
.5
5
5
0
.5
24
0
.5
6
3
0
.6
60
0
.5
45
[0
.3
1
3
0
.8
12
]
0
.7
22
0
.5
8
3
0
.5
56
0
.5
9
5
0
.7
03
0
.5
82
v
¼0
.5
0
[0
.3
3
5,
0
.7
89
]
0
.6
90
0
.5
7
2
0
.5
25
0
.5
7
1
0
.6
72
0
.5
56
[0
.3
1
3
0
.8
12
]
0
.7
29
0
.6
0
3
0
.5
56
0
.6
0
1
0
.7
15
0
.5
90
440 The Journal of Human Resources
II
I.
M
ea
n
H
o
sp
it
al
an
d
A
m
bu
la
to
ry
E
x
p
en
d
it
u
re
s
(s
ta
tu
s
q
u
o
¼
$
9
9
)
v
¼1
[$
9
2
,
$
2
5
8
]
$
1
2
1
$
1
2
1
$
1
2
1
$
1
2
1
$
1
2
0
$
1
2
0
[6
9
2
8
1
]
1
5
4
1
5
4
1
5
4
1
5
4
1
5
6
1
5
5
v
¼0
.8
9
[8
3
,
2
8
1
]
1
4
9
1
3
5
1
2
3
1
3
1
1
3
8
1
2
5
[5
9
3
0
4
]
1
8
6
1
6
7
1
5
5
1
6
7
1
7
7
1
6
4
v
¼0
.7
7
[8
3
,
2
9
4
]
1
6
7
1
3
9
1
2
4
1
4
1
1
5
0
1
3
3
[5
9
3
1
7
]
2
0
8
1
7
2
1
5
7
1
8
0
1
9
4
1
7
0
v
¼0
.5
0
[8
3
,
2
9
4
]
1
6
7
1
4
1
1
2
4
1
4
1
1
5
2
1
3
5
[5
9
3
1
7
]
2
0
8
1
7
3
1
5
7
1
8
0
1
9
6
1
7
9
D
at
a:
M
ed
ic
al
E
x
p
en
d
it
u
re
P
an
el
S
u
rv
ey
H
o
u
se
h
o
ld
C
o
m
p
o
n
en
t
an
d
li
n
k
ed
In
su
ra
n
ce
C
o
m
p
o
n
en
t
(1
9
9
6
).
S
am
p
le
m
em
b
er
s
ag
e
0
to
6
4
as
o
f
Ju
ly
,
1
9
9
6
.
N
o
te
s:
M
o
n
o
to
n
e
tr
ea
tm
en
t
re
sp
o
n
se
:
an
u
n
in
su
re
d
in
d
iv
id
u
al
’s
u
se
w
o
u
ld
n
o
t
d
ec
li
n
e
if
sh
e
b
ec
am
e
in
su
re
d
;
m
o
n
o
to
n
e
tr
ea
tm
en
t
se
le
ct
io
n
:
u
n
d
er
u
n
iv
er
sa
l
co
v
er
ag
e,
th
e
cu
rr
en
tl
y
in
su
re
d
w
o
u
ld
u
se
at
le
as
t
as
m
u
ch
se
rv
ic
es
as
th
e
cu
rr
en
tl
y
u
n
in
su
re
d
.
C
o
n
ta
m
in
at
ed
sa
m
p
li
n
g
im
p
o
se
s
P
(I
*
¼1
|Z
*
¼0
)¼
P
(I
*
¼1
|Z
*
¼1
),
n
o
n
d
if
fe
re
n
ti
al
er
ro
rs
im
p
o
se
s
P
(I
¼
1
|I
*
)
¼
P
(I
¼
1
|I
*
,U
),
an
d
n
o
n
in
cr
ea
si
n
g
er
ro
r
ra
te
s
im
p
o
se
s
P
(I
¼
1
|I
*
¼
0
,
U
1
)
#
P
(I
¼
1|
I*
¼
0
,U
0
)
an
d
P
(I
¼
1
|I
*
¼
0
,U
1
)
#
P
(I
¼
1
|I
*
¼
0
,U
0
)
fo
r
U
1
$
U
0
w
h
er
e
U
¼
u
se
,
v
is
it
s,
o
r
ex
p
en
d
it
u
re
s;
I*
¼
tr
u
e
in
su
ra
n
ce
st
at
u
s;
I
¼
re
p
o
rt
ed
in
su
ra
n
ce
st
at
u
s;
Z
*
¼
1
if
I*
¼
I.
M
o
n
o
to
n
e
in
st
ru
m
en
ta
l
va
ri
ab
le
s
es
ti
m
at
es
as
su
m
e
u
se
an
d
ex
p
en
d
it
u
re
s
ar
e
n
o
n
d
ec
re
as
in
g
in
ag
e
am
o
n
g
th
o
se
o
ld
er
th
an
3
0
an
d
n
o
n
d
ec
re
as
in
g
in
p
er
ce
iv
ed
w
o
rs
e
h
ea
lt
h
st
at
u
s.
†
P
o
in
t
es
ti
m
at
es
o
f
th
e
p
o
p
u
la
ti
o
n
b
o
u
n
d
s.
‡
9
5
p
er
ce
n
t
co
n
fi
d
en
ce
in
te
rv
al
s
fo
r
th
e
id
en
ti
fi
ca
ti
o
n
re
g
io
n
es
ti
m
at
ed
u
si
n
g
m
et
h
o
d
s
in
C
h
er
n
o
zh
u
k
o
v,
H
o
n
g
an
d
T
am
er
(2
0
0
7
).
Kreider and Hill 441
private insurance and in Table 5; they are reported in Column 7 with v ¼ 0:89 when
public coverage is extended to the uninsured.
In parametric studies, Miller, Banthin, and Moeller (2004) and Hadley and Holahan
(2003) estimate that expanding public programs to cover all the uninsured would in-
crease annual total expenditures between 9 percent and 10 percent. Our correspond-
ing nonparametric upper bound when v ¼ 0:89 is 26 percent. Their estimates, like
our own, do not account for any crowding out of private coverage. Their models as-
sume no measurement error, and self-selection into insured status is allowed only
through a set of observed characteristics. One likely reason our worst-case upper
bounds are substantially higher than their point estimates is that we do not impose
the homogeneity assumption that the impact of insurance coverage on utilization
is identical across individuals with the same observed characteristics. Miller, Banthin,
and Moeller and Hadley and Holahan also estimate that covering the uninsured with
private insurance would increase annual total expenditures between 11 percent and
17 percent, depending on their specific assumptions. For Massachusetts, Blumberg
et al. (2006) estimate the impact of potential expansions that would resemble the
mixture of private and public coverage expansions enacted in that state. They esti-
mate that expenditures would increase by about 12 percent.25 Our corresponding up-
per bound when v ¼ 0:92 is 16 percent.
Buchmueller et al. (2005) review studies of the impacts of insurance on the
amount of service use. Relying on a variety of comparison methods, parametric stud-
ies find that having insurance increases visits among the uninsured between 16 per-
cent and 106 percent. More recent studies, however, find a narrower range of effects.
Selden and Hudson (2006) estimate that expanding public insurance to cover unin-
sured children would increase their annual probability of having an ambulatory visit
by 54 percent, corresponding to an increase of about 7 percent across the nonelderly
population as a whole. They find that private coverage would increase the annual
probability by 61 percent, corresponding to an increase of about 8 percent across
the population as a whole. Estimates in Deb, Munkin, and Trivedi (2006) suggest that
expanding private insurance to uninsured adults would increase their number of of-
fice-based visits by about 46 percent, corresponding to an increase for the adult pop-
ulation of about 5 percent. Hadley and Holahan (2003), who do not account for
unobserved factors, estimate that public coverage would increase the annual number
of office-based visits among the uninsured by 41 percent, while private insurance
would increase visits by 30 percent. Their estimates correspond to increases of 5 per-
cent and 4 percent, respectively, among all nonelderly. For expansions involving a
mixture of private and public insurance, our estimated upper bound on the increase
in monthly office-based and hospital outpatient visits is 8 percent.
VI. Conclusion
Policymakers have long been interested in identifying the conse-
quences of uninsurance for access to healthcare and the potential impacts of
25. They model premiums, rather than healthcare expenditures, so their estimates implicitly include insur-
ance loading as well as expenditures for healthcare services.
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universal coverage (for example, Institute of Medicine 2003). Identification of pol-
icy outcomes, however, is confounded by both the unobservability of counterfac-
tuals and the potential unreliability of self-reported insurance status. To account
for these two distinct types of uncertainty, we developed a nonparametric frame-
work that extends the literature on partially identified probability distributions
and treatment effects. Using the new analytical results, we provided tight bounds
on the impact of universal health insurance on provider visits and medical expen-
ditures. As part of the paper’s contribution, we showed how to partially identify the
conditional mean of a random variable for the case that a binary conditioning var-
iable—in our case health insurance—is subject to arbitrary endogenous measure-
ment error.
Our conservative statistical approach provides informative bounds on parameters
of interest without imposing parametric assumptions. We began by corroborating
self-reported insurance status for a nonrandom portion of the MEPS sample using
outside information from insurance cards and followback interviews with employers
and insurance companies. We allowed for the possibility of insurance reporting
errors within the remainder of the sample and illustrated the sensitivity of our empir-
ical results to alternative verification, monotonicity, and independence assumptions.
For our preferred estimates, we introduced a ‘‘nonincreasing errors’’ assumption that
relaxes the strict nondifferential independence assumption embodied in the classical
errors-in-variables framework. In our application, the weaker monotonicity assump-
tion retains much of the identifying power of the independence assumption while
allowing for the possibility that using health services may inform a patient of her true
insurance status.
Our primary analysis considers the impact of extending insurance to the uninsured
using the mix of public and private coverage prevalent under the status quo. Pro-
grams intended to cover the uninsured in Massachusetts, Maine, and Vermont, and
proposals by some presidential candidates, would cover the uninsured with both pri-
vate and public insurance. We estimate that the fraction of the nonelderly population
using ambulatory or hospital services would rise no more than 9 percent under uni-
versal coverage. We further estimate that per capita monthly provider visits would
rise by no more than 8 percent, and mean expenditures per month would rise no more
than 16 percent. These estimated upper bounds rely on an assumption that no more
than 8 percent of unverified insurance classifications are misreported. While the ac-
curacy of unverified insurance responses cannot logically be known, we have relaxed
the standard implicit assumption that all classifications are known to be accurate. Un-
der our preferred monotonicity assumptions, we find that our estimates are not par-
ticularly sensitive to the degree of reporting error within plausible ranges. This
suggests that, contrary to some assertions, uncertainty about the number of uninsured
may not be a major impediment to developing programs to cover the uninsured. Our
estimated upper bounds on the effects of expanding public coverage, however, are
not as tight.
Our analysis has several limitations. First, the cost of covering the uninsured will
depend in part on the generosity of benefits, but our treatment effect approach
ignores heterogeneity across plan types in treating insurance as binary. Second,
our most informative bounds rely on an unverifiable assumption that, on average,
households who tend to use more health services have already self-selected
Kreider and Hill 443
themselves into the insured state. While we impose this assumption only across the
nonelderly population as a whole (allowing for the possibility that this tendency is
reversed within some subpopulations), the validity of the assumption cannot be di-
rectly verified. Third, our methods are less useful for estimating the cost of covering
an additional person. Marginal analyses require stronger assumptions about the char-
acteristics of the newly insured. Finally, the healthcare system continues to evolve,
and our 1996 data (which contain the best available validation information) were
gathered before SCHIP was implemented.
The methods developed in this paper can be applied to a wide range of topics that
involve identification of conditional expectations or treatment effects given uncer-
tainty about the accuracy of a conditioning variable. Our framework, for example,
offers an alternative approach to Blau and Gilleskie’s (2001) parametric analysis
of the impact of employer-provided retiree health insurance on retirement outcomes.
In the Health and Retirement Study data used in their study, about 13 percent of the
respondents nearing retirement age said they were unsure about whether they had re-
tiree insurance—thus forming a natural subpopulation of respondents to be charac-
terized as providing unreliable treatment information. The methods in this paper
could be used to bound the effects of retiree insurance on employment, informing
policymakers about the potential consequences of allowing retirees younger than
65 to purchase Medicare coverage. More generally, we expect this developing line
of research to improve researchers’ understanding of the consequences of nonclassi-
cal measurement error for inferences, which should in turn yield more informed pol-
icy analyses.
APPENDIX 1
Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. To place bounds on D, we begin by logically determining the
lowest feasible value of PðU# tjI ¼ 1Þ. Differentiating the right hand side of Equa-
tion 3, we find that this quantity is increasing in u#+t , the unobserved fraction of indi-
viduals with U. t misclassified as being insured, and in u2t , the unobserved fraction
of individuals with U# t misclassified as being uninsured. As a worst-case possibil-
ity for the lower bound, we must therefore set u#+t ¼ u2t ¼ 0 to obtain:
PðU # tjI ¼ 1Þ $ PðU # t; I ¼ 1Þ2ut
+
PðI ¼ 1Þ2u +t + u#2t
:ð18Þ
While u+t and u#
2
t are unobserved, their ranges are restricted. The unobserved frac-
tion that was falsely classified as insured, u+t ¼ PðU# t; I ¼ 1; Z ¼ 0Þ, cannot ex-
ceed the observed fraction that was classified as insured with unknown insured
status. Nor can this fraction exceed the total allowed fraction of misclassified cases,
fðvÞ[ ð12vÞPðY ¼ 0Þ. Similarly, the unobserved fraction of individuals that was
falsely classified as being uninsured, u#2t ¼ PðU. t; I ¼ 0; Z ¼ 0Þ, cannot exceed
the observed fraction that was classified as being uninsured with unknown insured
status; nor can it exceed the total fraction of misclassified cases:
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0 # u+t # minffðvÞ;PðU # t; I ¼ 1; Y ¼ 0Þg[ ut+
0 # u#t
2 # minffðvÞ;PðU.t; I ¼ 0; Y ¼ 0Þg[ u#t2 :
To find the lower bound of PðU# tjI ¼ 1Þ, we must find the minimum feasible
value for the right-hand side of Equation 18. Therefore, for any candidate value of
u+t , we need u#
2
t to attain its maximum allowed value conditional on u
+
t :
u#2t ¼ minffðvÞ2u +t ; u#2t g ¼ minffðvÞ2u +t ;PðU. t; I ¼ 0; Y ¼ 0Þg:
The objective then becomes one of minimizing
PðU # t; I ¼ 1Þ2u+t
PðI ¼ 1Þ2u+t + minffðvÞ2u+t ;PðU. t; I ¼ 0; Y ¼ 0Þg
ð19Þ
over feasible values of u+t .
Define u+ot [fðvÞ2PðU. t; I ¼ 0; Y ¼ 0Þ, the critical value of u+t that makes the
two arguments in the min function equal. First consider values of u+t #u
+o
t . For such
values, the derivative of Equation 19 with respect to u+t is negative; therefore,
we can exclude as potential candidates any values of u+t less than u
+
tmin[max 0;f
min u+t ; u
+o
t
n oo
. For u+t .u
+o
t , the derivative has the same sign as
dLt [PðU # t; I ¼ 1Þ2PðU. t; I ¼ 1Þ2fðvÞ:ð20Þ
When this quantity is negative, we must raise u+t to its maximum feasible value,
u+t ; otherwise, we set u
+
t equal to u
+
tmin. Similar logic provides an upper bound on
PðU # 1jI ¼ 1Þ. After defining dHt [PðU. t; I ¼ 1Þ2PðU# t; I ¼ 1Þ2fðvÞ, the
preceding results establish Proposition 1.
Proof of Proposition 2. Using Molinari’s (Forthcoming, p. 9) decomposition for
the case of missing observations, we begin by writing the distribution of U among
unverified cases as a weighted average of the distributions among unverified insured
and uninsured cases:
PðU# tjY ¼ 0Þ¼PðU# tjI¼1; Y¼ 0ÞP10 +PðU# tjI¼ 0; Y¼ 0Þð12P10Þ:ð21Þ
First consider a particular value of P10 2 ð0; 1Þ. Solving for the fraction consuming
U#t among the unverified currently insured implies
PðU# tjI¼1; Y¼ 0Þ ¼ PðU # tjY ¼ 0Þ2PðU # tjI
 ¼ 0; Y ¼ 0Þð12P10Þ
P10
:ð22Þ
The quantity PðU#tjI ¼ 0; Y ¼ 0Þ in the right-hand-side can be rewritten as
PðU # tjI ¼ 0; Y ¼ 0Þ ¼ PðU # t; I ¼ 0; Y ¼ 0Þ + u
+
t 2u
2
t
ð12P10ÞPðY ¼ 0Þ :ð23Þ
The upper bound on this quantity is obtained by setting u2t ¼ 0 and u+t equal to its
maximum feasible value. From Section IIIA, we know u+t #u
+
t . Combined with the
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requirement that PðU# tjI ¼ 0; Y ¼ 0Þ# 1, the value of u+t is restricted to lie in the
range 0#u+t #Q
+
t (where Q
+
t is defined in the proposition). The lower bound is
obtained by setting u+t ¼ 0 and u2t equal to its maximum feasible value, where u2t
is restricted to lie in the range 0#u2t #Q
2
t . Thus, PðU# tjI ¼ 0; Y ¼ 0Þ in Equa-
tion 23 is bounded to lie within ½V1ðt; vÞ;V2ðt; vÞ. Varying PðU# tjI ¼ 0; Y ¼ 0Þ
in Equation 22 within this feasible range reveals that PðU# tjI ¼ 1; Y ¼ 0Þ must
lie within the range ½GLðt; vÞ;GHðt; vÞ.26 Integrating across values of t, expected
healthcare utilization among the unverifiably truly insured is bounded as follows:Z
UdGH # EðUjI ¼ 1; Y ¼ 0Þ #
Z
UdGL:ð24Þ
Continuing with the case P10 2 ð0; 1Þ, applying this result to the first term in Equa-
tion 9 and varying E½UðI ¼ 1ÞjI ¼ 0; Y ¼ j within ½0; supU for j ¼ 0; 1 in Equa-
tions 8 and 9 yields the Proposition 2 bounds. These bounds also apply when P10 is
1 or 0. In the former case, E½UðI ¼ 1ÞjY ¼ 0Þ in Equation 9 is identified as
EðUjI ¼ 1; Y ¼ 0Þ ¼ EðUjY ¼ 0Þ since EðUjY ¼ 0Þ ¼ EðUjI ¼ 1; Y ¼ 0ÞP10 +
EðUjI ¼ 0; Y ¼ 0Þð12P10Þ. For P10 ¼ 0, we only know that E½UðI ¼ 1ÞjY ¼
0Þ ¼ E½UðI ¼ 1ÞjI ¼ 0; Y ¼ 0Þ 2 ½0; supU.
References
Aigner, Dennis J. 1973. ‘‘Regression with a Binary Independent Variable Subject to Errors of
Observation.’’ Journal of Econometrics 1(1):49–59.
Baker, Michael, Mark Stabile, and Catherine Deri. 2004. ‘‘What Do Self-Reported, Objective,
Measures of Health Measure?’’ Journal of Human Resources 39(4):1067–93.
Banthin, Jessica S., and Merrile Sing. 2006. ‘‘How Medicaid Enrollment Estimates from
MEPS Compare with Administrative Totals.’’ Rockville, Md.: Agency for Healthcare
Research and Quality, internal memorandum.
Balkrishnan, Rajesh, Roger T. Anderson, and David Bowton. 2000. ‘‘Self-reported Health
Status Predictors of Healthcare Services Utilization and Charges in Elderly Asthmatic
Patients.’’ Journal of Asthma 37(5):415–23.
Berger, Mark C., Dan A. Black, and Frank A. Scott. 1998. ‘‘How Well Do We Measure
Employer-Provided Health Insurance Coverage?’’ Contemporary Economic Policy
16(3):356–67.
Bierman, Arlene S., Thomas A. Bubolz, Elliott S. Fisher, and John H. Wasson. 1999. ‘‘How
Well Does a Single Question about Health Predict the Financial Health of Medicare
Managed Care Plans?’’ Effective Clinical Practice 2(2):56–62.
Blau, David M., and Donna B. Gilleskie. 2001. ‘‘Retiree Health Insurance and Labor Force
Behavior of Older Men in the 1990s.’’ Review of Economics and Statistics 83(1):64–80.
Blumberg, Linda J., John Holahan, Alan Weil, Lisa Clemans-Cope, Matthew Buettgens,
Fredric Blavin, and Stephen Zuckerman. 2006. ‘‘Toward Universal Coverage in
Massachusetts.’’ Inquiry 43(2):102–21.
26. Note that v. 0 also directly places restrictions on PðU# tjI ¼ 1;Y ¼ 0Þ. However, we can show that
the direct restrictions on this quantity represent a subset of the restrictions imposed on it indirectly via the
restrictions on PðU# tjI ¼ 0;Y ¼ 0Þ.
446 The Journal of Human Resources
Bollinger, Christopher R. 1996. ‘‘Bounding Mean Regressions When a Binary Variable is
Mismeasured.’’ Journal of Econometrics 73(2):387–99.
Bound, John. 1991. ‘‘Self-Reported Versus Objective Measures of Health in Retirement
Models.’’ Journal of Human Resources 26(1):106–38.
Bound, John, and Richard V. Burkhauser. 1999. ‘‘Economic Analysis of Transfer Programs
Targeted on People with Disabilities.’’ In Handbook of Labor Economics, vol. 3C, eds.
Orley Ashenfelter and David Card, 3417–3528. Amsterdam: Elsevier Science.
Bound, John, Charles Brown, and Nancy Mathiowetz. 2001. ‘‘Measurement Error in Survey
Data.’’ In Handbook of Econometrics, vol. 5, eds. James J. Heckman and Edward Leamer,
3705–3843. Amsterdam: Elsevier Science.
Buchmueller, Thomas C., Kevin Grumbach, Richard Kronick, and James G. Kahn. 2005.
‘‘The Effect of Health Insurance on Medical Care Utilization and Implications for
Insurance Expansion: A Review of the Literature.’’ Medical Care Research and Review
62(1):3–30.
Call, Kathleen Thiede, Michael Davern, Gestur Davidson, and Rebecca Nyman. 2007.
‘‘Accuracy in Self-Reported Health Insurance Coverage and Bias to Survey Estimates of
Uninsurance.’’ Presentation at the Academy Health Annual Research Meeting, Orlando, Fl.
Card, David, Andrew K. G. Hildreth, and Lara D. Shore-Sheppard. 2004. ‘‘The Measurement
of Medicaid Coverage in the SIPP: Evidence from a Comparison of Matched Records.’’
Journal of Business and Economic Statistics 22(4):410–20.
Chernozhukov, Victor, Han Hong, and Elie Tamer. 2007. ‘‘Estimation and Confidence
Regions for Parameter Sets in Econometric Models.’’ Econometrica 75(5):1243–84.
Cohen, Joel. 1993. ‘‘Medicaid Physician Fees and Use of Physician and Hospital Services.’’
Inquiry 30(3):281–92.
—————. 1997. ‘‘Design and Methods of the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey
Household Component.’’ MEPS Methodology Report no. 1, AHCPR Pub. no. 97-0026.
Rockville, Md.: Agency for Health Care Policy Research.
Czajka, John L., and Kimball Lewis. 1999. ‘‘Using Universal Survey Data to Analyze
Children’s Health Insurance Coverage: An Assessment of Issues.’’ Washington, D.C.:
Mathematica Policy Research, Inc., http://aspe.os.dhhs.gov/health/reports/Survey
percent20Data.htm.
Davern, Michael, Jacob Klerman, David Bough, Gary Ciborowski, Kathleen Thiede Call,
Gestur Davidson, and Lynn Blewett. 2007. ‘‘Fitting Square Pegs Into Round Holes:
Linking Medicaid and Current Population Survey Data to Understand the Medicaid
Undercount.’’ Presentation at the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, Baltimore,
Md.
Deb, Partha, Murat K. Munkin, and Pravin K. Trivedi. 2006. ‘‘Private Insurance, Selection,
and Health Care Use: A Bayesian Analysis of a Roy-Type Model.’’ Journal of Business and
Economic Statistics 24(4):403–15.
DeNaves-Walt, Carmen, Bernadette D. Proctor, and Cheryl Hill Lee. 2005. Income, Poverty,
and Health Insurance Coverage in the United States, 2004. U.S. Census Bureau, Current
Population Reports P60–229. Washington, D.C.: GPO.
DeSalvo, Karen B., Vincent S. Fan, Mary B. McDonell, and Stephan D. Fihn. 2005.
‘‘Predicting Mortality and Healthcare Utilization with a Single Question.’’ HSR: Health
Services Research 40(4):1234–46.
Dominitz, Jeff, and Robert P. Sherman. 2004. ‘‘Sharp Bounds Under Contaminated or
Corrupted Sampling with Verification, with an Application to Environmental Pollutant
Data.’’ Journal of Agricultural, Biological and Environmental Statistics 9(3):319–38.
Dor, Avi, Joseph Sudano, and David W. Baker. 2006. ‘‘The Effect of Private Insurance on the
Health of Older, Working Age Adults: Evidence from the Health and Retirement Study.’’
HSR: Health Services Research 41(3, Part I):759–87.
Kreider and Hill 447
Duchovny, Noelia, and Lyle Nelson. 2007. The State Children’s Health Insurance Program.
Washington, D.C.: Congressional Budget Office.
Frazis, Harley, and Mark A. Loewenstein. 2003. ‘‘Estimating Linear Regressions with
Mismeasured, Possibly Endogenous, Binary Explanatory Variables,’’ Journal of
Econometrics 117(1):151–78.
Gerfin, Michael, and Martin Schellhorn. 2006. ‘‘Nonparametric Bounds on the Effect of
Deductibles in Health Care Insurance on Doctor Visits—Swiss Evidence.’’ Health
Economics 15(9):1011–20.
Glied, Sherry, A. Bowen Garrett, Christina Hoven, Maritza Rubio-Stipec, Darrel Regier,
Robert E. Moore, Sherryl Goodman, Ping Wu, and Hector Bird. 1998. ‘‘Child Outpatient
Mental Health Service Use: Why Doesn’t Insurance Matter?’’ Journal of Mental Health
Policy and Economics 1(4):173–87.
Gruber, Jonathan, and Brigitte C. Madrian. 2004. ‘‘Health Insurance, Labor Supply, and Job
Mobility: A Critical Review of the Literature.’’ In Health Policy and the Uninsured, ed.
Catherine G. McLaughlin, 97–177. Washington, D.C.: Urban Institute.
Hadley, Jack, and John Holahan. 2003/2004. ‘‘Is Health Care Spending Higher under
Medicaid or Private Insurance?’’ Inquiry 40(4):323–42.
__________. 2003. ‘‘Covering the Uninsured: How Much Would It Cost?’’ Health Affairs
Supplemental Web Exclusives W3: 250–265.
Hill, Steven C. 2007/2008. ‘‘The Accuracy of Reported Insurance Status in the MEPS.’’
Inquiry 44(4):443–68.
Hirth, Richard A., Reagan A. Baughman, Michael E. Chernew, and Emilie C. Shelton. 2006.
‘‘Worker Preferences, Sorting and Aggregate Patterns of Health Insurance Coverage.’’
International Journal of Health Care Finance and Economics 6(4):259–77.
Holahan, John, and Linda Blumberg. 2006. ‘‘Massachusetts Health Care Reform: A Look at
the Issues.’’ Health Affairs 25: w432–w443.
Horowitz, Joel L., and Charles F. Manski. 1995. ‘‘Identification and Robustness with
Contaminated and Corrupted Data.’’ Econometrica 63(2):281–302.
__________. 1998. ‘‘Censoring of Outcomes and Regressors Due to Survey Nonresponse:
Identification and Estimation Using Weights and Imputations.’’ Journal of Econometrics
84(1):37–58.
Hudson, Julie L., and Thomas M. Selden. 2007. ‘‘Children’s Eligibility and Coverage: Recent
Trends and a Look Ahead.’’ Health Affairs 26(5): w618–w629.
Hunter, Derek. 2004. ‘‘Counting the Uninsured: Why Congress Should Look Beyond the
Census Figures.’’ Web Memo #555. Washington, DC: Heritage Foundation.
Idler, Ellen L., and Yael Benyamini. 1997. ‘‘Self-rated Health and Mortality: A Review of
Twenty-seven Community Studies.’’ Journal of Health and Social Behavior 38(1):21–37.
Idler, Ellen L., and Stanislav V. Kasl. 1995. ‘‘Self-ratings of Health: Do They Also Predict
Change in Functional Ability?’’ Journal of Gerontology 50B(6): S344–S353.
Institute of Medicine. 2003. Hidden Costs, Lost Value: Uninsurance in America. Washington,
D.C.: National Academy Press.
Kaestner, Robert. 1999. ‘‘Health Insurance, the Quantity and Quality of Prenatal Care, and
Infant Health.’’ Inquiry 36(2):162–75.
Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured. 2007. ‘‘State Initiatives to Cover
Children.’’ Washington, D.C.: Kaiser Family Foundation.
Kaye, Neva, and Andrew Snyder. 2007. ‘‘Health Reform in Maine, Massachusetts, and
Vermont: An examination of State Strategies to Improve Access to Affordable, Quality
Care.’’ Augusta, Me.: Maine Health Access Foundation Issue Brief.
Kreider, Brent, and John V. Pepper. 2007. ‘‘Disability and Employment: Reevaluating the
Evidence in Light of Reporting Errors.’’ Journal of the American Statistical Association,
102(478):432–41.
448 The Journal of Human Resources
Levy, Helen, and David Meltzer. 2004. ‘‘What Do We Really Know About Whether Health
Insurance Affects Health?’’ In Health Policy and the Uninsured, ed. Catherine G.
McLaughlin, 179–204. Washington, D.C.: Urban Institute.
Lewbel, Arthur. 2007. ‘‘Estimation of Average Treatment Effects with Misclassification.’’
Econometrica 75(2):537–51.
Long, Sharon K., Teresa Coughlin, and Jennifer Kling. 2005. ‘‘How Well Does Medicaid
Work in Improving Access to Care?’’ HSR: Health Services Research 40(1):39–58.
Manski, Charles F. 1995. Identification Problems in the Social Sciences. Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press.
__________. 1997. ‘‘Monotone Treatment Response.’’ Econometrica 65(6):1311–34.
Manski, Charles F., and John V. Pepper. 2000. ‘‘Monotone Instrumental Variables: With an
Application to the Returns to Schooling.’’ Econometrica 68(4):997–1010.
Miilupalo, Seppo, Ilkku Vuori, Pekku Oja, Matti Pasanen, and Helku Urponen. 1997. ‘‘Self-
rated Health Status as a Health Measure: The Predictive Value of Self-reported Health
Status on the Use of Physician Services and on Mortality in the Working-age Population.’’
Journal of Clinical Epidemiology 50(5):517–28.
Miller, G. Edward, Jessica Banthin, and John Moeller. 2004. ‘‘Covering the Uninsured:
Estimates of the Impact on Total Health Expenditures for 2002.’’ AHRQ Working Paper
04007. Rockville, Md.: Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality.
Mitchell, Janet. 1991. ‘‘Physician Participation in Medicaid Revisited.’’ Medical Care
29(7):645–53.
Molinari, Francesca. Forthcoming. ‘‘Missing Treatments.’’ Journal of Business and Economic
Statistics.
––––––––––. 2008. ‘‘Partial Identification of Probability Distributions with Misclassified
Data.’’ Journal of Econometrics 144(1):81–117
Monheit, Alan C., and Jessica Primoff Vistnes. 2008. ‘‘Health Insurance Enrollment
Decisions: Preferences for Coverage, Worker Sorting, and Insurance Take Up.’’ Inquiry
45(2):153–67.
Nelson, David E., Betsy L. Thompson, Nancy J. Davenport, and Linda J. Penaloza. 2000.
‘‘What People Really Know about Their Health Insurance: A Comparison of Information
Obtained from Individuals and Their Health Insurers.’’ American Journal of Public Health
90(6): 94–8.
Nelson, Lyle. 2003. How Many People Lack Health Insurance and For How Long?
Washington, D.C.: Congressional Budget Office.
Olson, Craig A. 1998. ‘‘A Comparison of Parametric and Semiparametric Estimates of the
Effect of Spousal Health Insurance Coverage on Weekly Hours Worked by Wives.’’
Journal of Applied Econometrics 13(5):543–65.
Pascale, Joanne. 2007. ‘‘Measuring Health Insurance in the U.S.’’ Research Report Series
(Survey Methodology #2007–11). Washington, DC: US Census Bureau, Statistical
Research Division.
Peterson, Chris L., and April Grady. 2005. Medicaid/SCHIP Enrollees: Comparison of Counts
from Administrative Data and Survey Estimates. Washington, DC: Congressional Research
Service.
Selden, Thomas M., and Julie L. Hudson. 2006. ‘‘Access to Care and Utilization Among
Children: Estimating the Effects of Public and Private Coverage.’’ Medical Care 44(5
Supplement): I-19-I-26.
Wolter, Kirk M. 1985. Introduction to Variance Estimation. New York: Springer-Verlag.
Woolhandler, Steffie, and David U. Himmelstein. 2007. ‘‘Health Reform Failure.’’ Boston
Globe, September 17, A15.
Kreider and Hill 449
